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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law-Enforcement of Subpoenas Duces Tecun Issued by
Administrative Agency.-Pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959,1 subpoenas duces tecum were issued by the United
States Department of Labor directed to the respondent unions to determine
whether any member had violated any provision of the act,2 and to verify
certain organizational and financial reports required to be filed with the Secre-
tary of Labor.3 The unions failed to comply with these subpoenas, alleging that
they were too broad, and that being voluntary associations, the law pertaining
to the amenability of corporations to administrative subpoenas was not ap-
plicable to them. Thereupon, on the application of the Secretary of Labor the
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued an order to show
cause why the subpoenas should not be enforced. Enforcement of the sub-
poenas was denied because the Secretary did not show that he had any reason-
able basis for the investigation. Mitchell v. Truck Drivers Union, 191 F.
Supp. 229 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
While never using the precise words "probable cause," the court has never-
theless interpreted the words of the act, "when he believes it necessary in
order to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any
1. 73 Stat. 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Supp. II, 1959-1960) provides; "The S crp-
tary shall have the power when he believes it necessary in order to dctermine whcthcr
any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this chapter ... to make
an investigation . . .and inspect such records and accounts and question cuch p- ons as
he may deem necessary to enable him to determine the facts relative therlto."
2. 73 Stat. 539, 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Supp. II, 1959-1960). See 191 F. Supp. 229, 230
(E.D. MAich. 1961).
3. 73 Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 431(b) (Supp. II, 1959-1960) provides that "every
labor organization shall file annually with the Secretary a financial report signcd by its
president and treasurer or corresponding principal officers . . .in such detail as may be
necessary accurately to disclose its financial condition and oprrations for its pr.ceding
fiscal year. . . ." Both unions filed such reports for the fiscal year 1959, but refu:zd to
produce the records from which these reports can be verified and checked for accuracy.
4. 73 Stat. 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 521(b) (Supp. II, 1959-19CO) mahe3 the provizions
of 38 Stat. 722 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1953), "applicable to the jurizdic-
tion, powers, and duties of the Secretary or any officcrs deiqnated by him:' 3, Stat. 722
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (195s) provides in part: "[A]nd the commission shall have power
to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production
of all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under invefigation. . . Such
attendance of witnesses, and the production of such documentary evidence, may L,- re-
quired from any place in the United States, at any designated place of hearing. And in
case of disobedience to a subpoena the commission may invoke the aid of any court of the
United States in requiring the attendance and testimony of vitnezzcs and the production of
documentary evidence. Any of the district courts of the Urdtcd States . ..may, in case
of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any corporation or other psrzon,
issue an order requiring such corporation or other person ... to produce documentary
evidence if so ordered ... and any failure to obey such order of the court may he punisbed
by such court as a contempt thereof."
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provision of this chapter.. ."i to mean when he has probable cause to believe
any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this chapter,
and thus makes a showing of probable cause a prerequisite to the enforcement
of these subpoenas. What other meaning can be gathered from the words of
the court in interpreting this phrase when it says "this court feels that the
requirement of when 'he deems it necessary' . . . has its foundation in some
reason or purpose, rather than being an excuse for merely looking into the
matters of union affairs, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope of something turn-
ing up, be it of any nature, without some reasonable foundation or valid pur-
pose . . ."?' The fact that the instant court stresses the points that no charge
or complaint had ever been filed with the Secretary of Labor involving the
respondent unions,7 nor did he "have any reason to believe any violation of
law... [had] been committed or contemplated by the respondent unions . .. ,
emphasizes further that the court is requiring a showing of probable cause.
The instant court has based its decision on FTC v. American Tobacco Co.,
0
where similar subpoenas, issued pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission
Act, were held to be too broad because the Commissioner did not show that
he had reason to believe that the papers called for would disclose any violation
of the Act,10 i.e., he did not have probable cause to believe that the act had
been violated. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, condemned the
broad subpoena power exercised by administrative agencies stating that "any-
one who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amendment
would be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize one of its sub-
ordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into the fire . . . and to direct
fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose
evidence of crime."" Mr. Justice Holmes, however, did not deny that Congress
had the power to direct fishing expeditions, but stated that it would take "the
5. 73 Stat. 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
6. 191 F. Supp. at 234. Nor is the language of the court inconsistent with this Inter-
pretation for it says that "if the words 'when he deems it necessary' are to be given any
meaning, then there must be some showing beyond the mere action of proceeding by the
Secretary of Labor, i.e., the showing of necessity." Id. at 232. This showing of necessity
which the court is calling for can mean nothing else, if these words are to be given any
meaning, than a showing of probable cause.
7. In the very beginning of the opinion the court stated: "In the hearings before this
court, together with arguments of respective counsel and through the briefs, pleadings and
exhibits, the Secretary of Labor has never indicated that there was any complaint or charge
either filed with or pending before him involving the respondents." 191 F. Supp. at 229.
8. Id. at 230.
9. 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
10. 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-46(a) (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
The Court stated: "Some ground must be shown for supposing that the documents
called for do contain it [evidence]. . . . A general subpoena in the form of these petitions
would be bad. Some evidence of the materiality of the papers demanded must be produced."
264 U.S. at 306. See also Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
11. 264 U.S. at 305-06. (Emphasis added.)
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most explicit language" before the Court would attribute to Congress such an
intent.12
The ruling of Amcrican Tobacco that reasonable cause to believe that the
act has been violated must first be shown before subpoenas will be enforced
was whittled away by a number of lower court decisions. 13 Eventually in
Oklalawa Press Pesblishhng Co. v. Walling,14 where subpoenas duces tecum
were issued to determine whether the publishing company was violating the
Fair Labor Standards Act,'5 the Court found the requisite "explicit language"
to which Mr. Justice Holmes had alluded. 10 As in American Tobacco the sub-
poenas were resisted on the grounds that no charge or complaint had been
filed and that the proceeding was merely a "fishing expedition," and thus
violative of petitioner's rights under the fourth amendment. The Court rejected
this argument, pointing out that the fourth amendment "if applicable, at the
most guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth
in the things required to be 'particularly described,' if also the inquiry is one
the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified
are relevant."' 7 It is not necessary that a specific charge or violation of law
be pending as in the case of a warrant.'8 Enforcement of such subpoenas does
not constitute an illegal search and seizure thus violative of the fourth amend-
ment, provided:
12. In discussing whether or not Congress has the power to authorize adminitrative
agencies to issue subpoenas without a showing of probable cause, Justice Holmc3 stated:
"We do not discuss the question whether it [Congrezs] could do so if it tried, as nothing
short of the most explicit language would induce us to attribute to Congrc3 that intent:
264 U.S. at 3C6.
13. Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 3M4 (7th Cir. 1940), was one of
the first cases to hold that a showing of probable cause was not required. There the court
stated that "the scope and purpose of the Act, the proper excrdce of the authority con-
ferred upon the Administrator, and the effective performance of his duties, are inconHtent
with an intention to limit inspection of books and records to cases in which the Administra-
tor has reasonable cause to believe an employer is violating the provisions of the Act."
Id. at 387. See also Walling v. La Belle S.S. Co., 143 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1945); Walling
v. American Rolbal Corp., 135 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1943); Fleming v. Easton Publishing Co.,
38 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
14. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
15. 52 Stat. 1066 (193S), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1953). Section 211(a) is
substantially the same as that in the instant case, and provides that "The Administrator
. . . may investigate . . . such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may dcan
necessary or appropriate to determine whether any person has violated any provi-lon of
this chapter, or which may aid in the enforcement of the proviions of this chapter."
16. The Court distinguishes this statute from that involved in American Tobacco and
concludes that here is a case of "'explicit language' which leaves no room for questioning
Congress' intent." 327 U.S. at 201.
17. Id. at 203.
13. "The very purpose of the subpoena and of the order, as of the authorized invcztiga-
tion, is to discover and procure evidence, not to prove a pending charge or complaint, but
upon which to make one if, in the Administrator's judgment, the facts thus discovrcd
should justify doing so." Id. at 201. See also Sherwood, The Enforcement of Adminitrative
Subpoenas, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 531 (1944); Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1541 (1953).
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(1) The documents ordered are relevant to the inquiry, are specifically
described, and the enforcement is not unduly burdensome; (2) The investi-
gation is one which the agency is authorized to make.1 9
This is the norm which has been used by the courts in deciding the constitu-
tional question.2 0 It is not even necessary for the agency, seeking enforcement,
to prove that the enabling statute has given it jurisdiction over those
against whom the subpoenas have been issued. All that it required is merely an
allegation of "coverage."1
21
An examination of the legislative history of the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act shows that Congress never intended that the Secretary
be required to make a showing of probable cause. The Landrum-Griffin bill
as originally presented provided that "the Secretary shall, when he has probable
cause to believe that any person has violated any provision o1 this Act ... make
an investigation. '22 Similarly, the original Kennedy-Ervin bill contained almost
identical language.23 The bill as finally reported to the Senate, and as passed,
however, deleted the words "probable cause" and inserted the phrase "when he
believes it necessary. " 24 After it passed the Senate, the bill was sent to a House
19. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501
(1943); Detweiler Bros. v. Walling, 157 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1946); SEC v. Vacuum
Can Co., 157 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1946).
20. United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 19; Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins, supra note 19; Westside Ford Inc. v. United States, 206 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953);
Detweiler Bros. v. Walling, supra note 19; Walling v. La Belle S.S. Co., 148 F.2d 198
(6th Cir. 1945); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1941); United
States v. Household Goods Movers Investigation, 184 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1960).
21. United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 19; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Walling v. Benson, 137 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1943); Martin
Typewriting Co. v. Walling, 135 F.2d 918 (1st Cir. 1943); Application of Walling, 50
F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Walling v. W.G. Golebiewski, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 448
(W.D.N.Y. 1942); In re Standard Dredging Corp., 44 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd,
132 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1943). But cf. General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d
596 (6th Cir. 1942); Application of Walling, 49 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.J. 1943); Fleming v.
G & C Novelty Shoppe, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Il1. 1940).
22. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601(a) (1959). (Emphasis added.)
23. The original Kennedy-Ervin bill provided that "the Secretary shall have the power
and is directed, when he has probable cause to believe that any person or labor organiza-
tion has violated any provision of this title, to make an investigation . S. 505, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(c) (1959).
24. S. 1555, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. § 206(c) (1959) provides: "The Secretary shall have
power and is directed when he believes it necessary in order to determine whether any per-
son has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act ... to make an investigation.
. The minority opinion which accompanied the report of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare explained why the words "probable cause" had been deleted. "On
the surface, the term 'probable cause' would appear to give the Secretary all of the In-
vestigatory power that he needed. But the words 'probable cause' would throw a monkey




conference committee. The committee issued a report stating that the "confer-
ence adopted the broader Senate language with respect to investigations and
enforcement powers of [the] Secretary of Labor."- Thus the court, in the
instant case, in requiring a showing of probable cause, is raising a problem
which Congress tried to avoid.
In the light of this history, and the holdings of Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co.,2, Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,2 7 and United States v. Morton Salt
Co., s where the Court held that it was not necessary for the Commissioner to
believe that the act had been violated in order to enforce the subpoenas, it is
difficult to understand the reluctance of the instant court to enforce similar
ones. The subpoenas were clearly not irrelevant on their face. The documents
were specifically described 2 and were those which were required to be kept for
five years after the reports based on these records had been filed$l
The court attempts to reconcile this conffict by limiting the rulings of Okla-
homa Press Publishking Co., Endicott Johnson, and Morton Salt to subpoenas
issued against corporations. 1 The court appears to take the view that a corpora-
tion has no rights whatsoever under the fourth amendment, for it states that
"the [Union's] voluntary association does have the elements of individual
persons sufficiently so that the Fourth Amendment does give some protection,
if we are to give any meaning to that Fourth Amendment."32 Oklahoma Press
did not deny corporations the protection of the fourth amendment3 3 A corpora-
tion is protected by the fourth amendment if the exanination is not authorized
by an act of Congress, or if the subpoena is too broad, or is dearly irrelevant on
its face.34 Moreover, the court in the instant case recognizes the fact that the
25. 105 Cong. Rec. 1S022 (1959) (remarks of Congressman Griffin). Senator Goldwater
in commenting on the difference between the House and the Senate bill ftated that "the
proisions in the Senate bill do not hamper the investigatory power by rcquiring protable
cause.... [T~he House bill restricts the Secretary's power to investiate... ." 105 Cong.
Rec. 16490 (1959).
26. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
27. 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
28. 33S U.S. 632 (1950).
29. See subpoenas, 191 F. Supp. at 230.
30. 73 Stat. 529 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 436 (Supp. II, 1959-19C0) requires that every
person required to file reports shall maintain records on the matters required to be reported
from which the documents filed with the Secretary may be vcrificd, explained and cbchlcd
for accuracy, for a period of not less than five years from the fling of the rcportu.
31. "This court would be loath to extend any further the doctrines enunciated in the
Oklahoma Press case. Corporations, perhaps, because they are artificial creatures, have falle
to the onslaught, but ve note that the court there took great pains to emphasize and rc-
emphasize that the application of the principles set forth there should apply only to corpora-
tions." 191 F. Supp. at 233. This statement by the instant court is milcading, for OJahoma
Press did not limit its ruling specifically to corporations, but only corporations as oppoZcd
to individuals.
32. 191 F. Supp. at 233.
33. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
34. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); 01"lahoma Prezs Publihing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 1S6 (1946); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perldns, 317 U.S. 501
19611
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rule regarding the fifth amendment is the same for both a corporation and a
union.n5 No officer of a corporation or of a union, acting in his official capacity,
can assert the privilege of the fifth amendment in producing the books and
records of the corporation or the union, even if their production would tend
to convict the officer of a crime.36
The application of the fifth amendment rule to unions was pointed out most
vividly in United States v. White,3 7 where a grand jury, investigating alleged
irregularities in the construction of a naval supply depot, issued a subpoena
duces tecum against the union involved. A union official, in pursuance of an
order of the district court, appeared with the records in his possession and
claimed the privilege of the fifth amendment on behalf of himself and the
union. He was then held in contempt of court. It was held that the records
of the unions were not the private records of the individual members and, there-
fore, no claim of personal privilege existed either under the fourth or fifth
amendments.3 8
There is no justification for holding that the fourth amendment is different
for a union than for a corporation when the fifth applies to both. As pointed
out in Boyd v. United States39 the fourth and fifth amendments run almost into
each other. The Court stated that they had been "unable to perceive that the
seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him
is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against him-
self."'40 There is not such a disparity between the structure of a union and
that of a corporation to warrant two separate rules, for as stated in the White
case both are separate entities. 41 Both own separate personal and real property;
both keep books which are distinct from the personal books of its members, 42
(1943); Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
35. In considering whether or not the fifth amendment afforded the union any protec-
tion, the court stated: "The arguments made in Oklahoma Press concerning the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution are not applicable here.... [SIuch an argu-
ment would not 'hold water' in light of the doctrines enunciated there and in United States
v. White .... " 191 F. Supp. at 231.
36. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S.
151 (1923); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
37. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
38. The Court stated: "We hold, however, that neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Amend-
ment, both of which are directed primarily to the protection of the individual and personal
rights, requires the recognition of a privilege against self-incrimination under the circum-
stances of this case." Id. at 698. "Such records and papers are not the private records
of the individual members or officers of the organization. . . They therefore embody no
element of personal privacy and carry with them no claim of personal privilege." Id. at
699-70.
39. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
40. Id. at 633.
41. See note 38 supra. See also note 42 infra.
42. 322 U.S. at 702. See also United States v. B. Goedde & Co., 40 F. Supp. 523 (E.D.
Ill. 1941), where the court pointed out that the papers of the association were in no wise
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and both are capable of suing and being sued in its own name.P3 Thus there is
no sound reason for holding that Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. is not control-
ling here and for refusing enforcement of the subpoenas.
.Antitrust-Complete Divestiture Necessary to Eliminate Violation of
Section 7 of Clayton Act.-In 1949 the United States instituted an action
charging E. L du Pont de Nemours & Company .ith violations of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act' and section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 The
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the complaint,3
but the Supreme Court reversed,- holding du Pont's acquisition and retention
of twenty-three per cent of the stock of the General Motors Corporation and
the resultant domination by du Pont of General Motors' suppliers of automotive
finishes and fabrics to constitute a tendency to monopolization of a line of
commerce and hence a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Court
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of the remedy
necessary to rectify the situation. Accordingly, the district court conducted ex-
tensive hearings, appointed amici curiae to represent the corporations' share-
holders and finally issued a decree rejecting the Government's request for
complete divestiture as having "serious adverse consequences."0 Instead, it
the papers of the individual members, but belonged to the separate legal entity, the union,
and were not immune from production.
43. United Aline Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922). Here the union argued
that it could not be sued in its own name but only in the name of its mcmerns. It vas
held otherwise, the Court pointing out that their strike funds vere subject to exczution
for torts committed by them in strikes. Id. at 38-6.
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1S90), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1953).
2. 3S Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1953), which provide3 in pzrtinent
part as follows: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectily,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subjcct to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the a.sets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-stantially to lessu
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly .... This section shall not apply to cor-
porations purchasing such stock solely for investment and not using the same by voting
or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial le:cning of
competition."
3. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235 (ND. III. 1954).
4. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 536 (1957). It is intcrest-
ing to note that this was the first action in which section 7 was employed to defeat a
vertical merger. See 26 Note, Fordham L. Rev. 5S3 (19S7). The decision has bezn properly
criticized for confusing the "relevant market" concept as found in the earlier du Pont
"Cellophane Case," United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 US. 377 (1956),
71 Harv. L. Rev. 165 (1957), 66 Yale LJ. 1251 (1957).
5. 177 F. Supp. 1 (ND. Ill. 1959).
6. Id. at 42. The district court had expert testimony that individual du Pont share-
holders could, under the Government's plan for complete divestiture, be liable for taxes
1961] CASE NYOTES
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adopted the du Pont plan to retain ownership of its General Motors stock but
to "pass through" the voting rights to the du Pont shareholders. 7 The
Supreme Court, again on direct appeal by the Government,8 in a four to three
decision, held the relief granted below inadequate to accomplish removal of
the section 7 violation, and vacated the decree. The case was remanded to the
district court with instructions to devise a plan embracing complete divestiture
of du Pont's General Motors stock within ten years.9 United States v. E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 clearly enunciated a congressional intent
to foster free competition by making it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations. ... "10 The
Clayton Act of 191411 was enacted to supplement the Sherman Act by specify-
ing particular acts as antitrust violations which, if permitted to continue, might
well develop into more serious monopolistic offenses under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. The United States Supreme Court has pointed out that, "the end
amounting to over $1,000,000,000 (based on a fair market value of $50.00 for each
share of General Motors). This was calculated from statistical surveys showing that the
average du Pont shareholder would have to pay income taxes in the 50-60% tax brackets.
An additional $200,000,000 in taxes might have to be paid by Christiana and Delaware
for the stock allocable to them--even using the lower capital gains tax rate of 25%.
7. In substance, du Pont would retain all the attributes of ownership of the General
Motors stock except the power to vote. This would be "passed through" to the du Pont
shareholders pro rata, with the exception of the Christiana Securities Corp. and the
Delaware Realty and Investment Co. (two holding companies long identified with the
du Pont family) and the officers and directors and members of their immediate families.
None of the latter would be allowed to vote the General Motors stock which they owned
or would be otherwise allocable to them. Du Pont, Christiana, and Delaware were forbidden
to acquire any additional General Motors stock. No officer or director of du Pont,
Christiana, or Delaware might be an officer or director of General Motors; nor might any
of the former nominate or attempt to influence in any way the election of such persons
in General Motors. Furthermore, du Pont and General Motors were enjoined (for as long
as the former owned stock of the latter) from having any business dealings which required
General Motors to purchase a fixed percentage of the former's production, or which would
give du Pont any sort of a preference.
8. Direct appeal from the trial court to the United States Supreme Court in antitrust
cases is provided for by the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 29 (1958).
9. Petition by du Pont for modification of the ten year period for completion denied,
366 U.S. 956 (1961). "Du Pont filed its proposal for disposal of the shares on
Sept. 2. The Department of Justice handed its suggestions today [Oct. 2] to the United
States District Court in Chicago. The points of similarity are these: Dupont can choose
its methods of disposal. . . . It must start ninety days after Judge Walter J. La Buy
enters the final judgment and must complete the divesting process in ten years. . . . The
court will retain jurisdiction until the transfers are completed." N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1961,
p. 53, col. 6.
10. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). Section 4 authorizes
proceedings by a court of equity to eliminate monopolistic practices and restore competition.
26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
11. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
[Vol. 30
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to be served is not punishment of past transgression, nor is it merely to end
specific illegal practices. A public interest served by such civil suits is that they
effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants'
illegal restraints."' 2 It is left to the courts to devise effective remedies to restore
or safeguard free competition. Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbids the acquisi-
tion by one corporation of the shares of another where the result "may be to
substantially lessen" competition within the economy or the creation of a
tendency to create a monopoly of any line of commerce. 13 Where the viola-
tion involves a tendency towards monopoly, the decree must be such as to
remove that tendency, and where the tendency arises from the acquisition and
retention of another corporation's stock, the most obvious and effective, albeit
most drastic, forms of relief from violations of section 7 is divestiture, divorce-
ment, or dissolution.14  Section 11 of the Clayton Act specifically mentions
divestiture as a remedy for an offense to section 7 ,15 and, as noted by the Court,
"of the very few litigated section 7 cases which have been reported, most
decreed divestiture as a matter of course."' Where the control of corporations
was merely a device to carry out illegal combinations and the heart of the
violations was the conspiracy of the defendants who controlled the corpora-
tions, and not merely the fact of the relationship of the defendants to the cor-
poration,' 7 then some alternative to dissolution or divestiture has been em-
ployed-usually in the form of injunctive relief or royalty-free licensing.18
12. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
13. 33 Stat. 731 (1941), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1950).
14. "Divestiture refers to situations where the defendants are required to divert them-
selves of property, securities, or other assets. Divorcement is . .. usEd to indicate the
effect of a decree where certain types of divestiture are ordered; it is espcially applicable
to cases where the purpose of the proceeding is to secure relief against antitrut abuses
flowing from integrated ownership or control. The term 'dissolution' is generally uzcd to
refer to any situation where the dissolving of an allegedly illegal combination or aocia-
tion is involved, including the use of divestiture and divcrceent as method-, of achieving
that end. While the foregoing definitions differentiate three aspects of remedies, the tcrms,
are frequently used interchangeably without any technical di&tinctions in meaning.!,
Oppenheim, Cases on Federal Anti-Trust Laws SS5 (1948).
15. Section 11 authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to enforce cxctions 2, 3, 7,
and 8, providing that if the Commission find that any of those sections have been or
are being violated, it shall make a written report of its finding:, and shall: "Lzue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring such perzon to cease and d1t from
such violations, and divest itself of the stock, or other share capital, or a- ets held, or rid
itself of the directors chosen contrary to the provisions of sections [7 & 8] of this title,
if any there he, in the manner and within the time fixcd by said order." 33 Stat. 73S
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
16. 366 U.S. at 330.
17. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 US. 593 (1951), a domeAtic
corporation conspired with two foreign corporations in which it had financial intercts to
restrain interstate and foreign trade in the single product manufactured by the cctrporation,
18. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, supra note 17; United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 33 (1912); United States v. Ainnezota Mining & Mfg.
Co., 96 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1951).
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This was the nature of the relief decreed by the lower court: injunctive prohibi-
tions plus the novel plan to "pass through" most of du Pont's voting rights to
its shareholders.
Both the majority and minority of the Court approved the criteria of proper
relief enumerated in United States v. American Tobacco Co.: 19
In considering the subject ... three dominant influences must guide our action:
1. The duty of giving complete and efficacious effect to the prohibitions of the
statute; 2, the accomplishing of this result with as little injury as possible to the
interest of the general public; and, 3, a proper regard for the vast interests of
private property which may have become vested in many persons as a result of the
acquisition either by way of stock ownership or otherwise of interests in the stock
or securities of the combination without any guilty knowledge or intent in any way
to become actors or participants in the wrongs which we find to have inspired and
dominated the combination from the beginning.20
However, the adequacy of the relief decreed below divided the Court. The
majority stressed that the first and most important attribute of relief in such a
case is to give "complete and efficacious effect to the prohibitions of the
statute,"12 and only then might the other consequences be considered. The Court
did not think the decree of the district court met this primary requirement.
Although du Pont's direct influence over General Motors would have been at
least weakened by the disfranchisement of the du Pont corporation and family
and the "pass through" of the vote to the other more scattered shareholders,
still, approximately two-thirds of the 63,000,000 shares of General Motors now
held by du Pont would continue to be voted by du Pont shareholders. It would
be unreasonable not to assume, argued the Court, that these would continue to
be voted for the intermingled interests of the two giant corporations, and that
the officials of General Motors would take cognizance of the relatively un-
changed relationship to du Pont 2 2 Thus, the very conditions section 7 had been
designed to eradicate,23 and which the Supreme Court had ordered the district
court to eliminate, would remain, i.e., substantial ownership by one corporation
of the stock of another in the same line of commerce, whereby the former has
the ability to exercise undue control in restraint of trade. Control might well
be continued without the voting rights.2 4 Therefore, with partial divestiture
19. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
20. Id. at 185. Defendant monopolized the tobacco industry. The remedy decreed,
despite the hardship that had been feared, was the celebrated three-way dissolution In
which the corporation was divided into three roughly equal parts, thereby replacing the
monopoly with an oligopoly.
21. 366 U.S. at 327.
22. Id. at 331-32.
23. "The intent here ... is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and
well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding.
...To make clearer the intent to give the bill broad application to acquisitions that are
economically significant, its wording has been broadened in certain respects." S. Rep.
No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
24. "Historical ties and associations, combined with strategic holdings of stock, can
on occasion serve as a potent substitute for the more obvious modes of control." North
American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 693 (1946).
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via the "pass through" of the voting rights an inadequate remedy, the Court
found no occasion to consider the second and third criteria, to vit, the protec-
tion of public and private interests, which it had set forth in Amcrican Tobacco.
Said Mr. Justice Brennan for the Court:
The adverse tax and market consequences which the District Court found v;ould be
concomitants of complete divestiture cannot save the remedy of partial divestiture
through the "pass through" of voting rights if, though less harsh, partial divestiture
is not an effective remedy. We do not think that the "pass through" is an effective
remedy and believe that the Government is entitled to a decree directing complete
divestiture2 5
In a persuasive dissent, MUr. Justice Frankfurter stressed the fact that the
district court held exhaustive hearings and reviewed every circumstance of the
case to determine the most appropriate and effective relief. He found its decree
more likely to protect the general public and the shareholders of du Pont and
of General 'Motors from the predicted market slump and heavy tax levies which
would accompany complete divestiture. The dissent preferred to give effect
to the second and third criteria of Ancrican Tobacco.2 Noting that du Pont
did not stand guilty of any violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act,27 as did
many of the corporations in the cases cited by the Government as precedents
for divestiture, 2s the dissent argued that:
Once all of du Pont's ties to General Motors, save its stock interest, v;ere severed
the record is barren of justification for an inference of reasonable probability of
restraint of trade. Conversely . . . the tax and market consequence of divestiture
would be so onerous that, in the absence of any serious anticompetitive danger, it
would have constituted an abuse of discretion to enter such a decree.2
The main concern of the district court and of the dissent was the effect
divestiture would have taxwise on the shareholders of du Pont, and marketwise
25. 366 U.S. at 323. Concurring were Chief Justice Warren and Justicc Douglas and
Black. Justices Clark and Harlan took no part in the decision.
26. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 US. 1c5 (1911). Note that in American,
Tobacco the Court, due to the public welfare and the effect on sharcholdcrz, felt coretrained
to avoid an order restraining interstate activity by the conspiracy until the monopoly
had been destroyed; nor would the Court appoint a recciver to dectroy the cons:piracy
by means of sale. Id. at 186-S7. Still the Court ordered a hearing at which an cficetive
remedy was to be determined and a condition in harmony with the law establishcd.
27. The district court had dismissed all charges against the defendants. The Supreme
Court disposed of the case by holding du Pont guilty of a %iolation of tcction 7 of the
Clayton Act. It did not find it necessary to determine the question of Shcrman Antitrust
Act violations which had also been charged. See 353 U.S. at 583 n.S.
28. See, e.g, United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255 (1920); Unitcd StatQ-
v. Reading Co, 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S 61 (1912) ;
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. Unitcd
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
29. 366 U.S. at 375 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dizsnt noted the basic fairncz
of a decree less harsh, terming the lower court's decree entirely adequate. See FTC v.
National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957); United Statcz v. United State: Gypzum Co.,
340 U.S. 76, S9-90 (1950).
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on the national economy.30 But, in their anxiety to avoid harsh consequences,
they failed to consider adequately the primary criterion of antitrust relief-
the public's interest in continued free competition. If this case is an example,
it can be seen how difficult and time-consuming is the Government's case to
prove antitrust violations especially in vertical acquisition cases where it is
expected that the parties will continue doing business with each other. So it
is that once the Government has successfully established a violation, all doubts
as to the proper remedy are resolved in its favor.31 Considering the size and
influence possessed by the parties defendant, and their past conduct, there is
well-founded reason to doubt the sufficiency of the district court's decree. '
In antitrust actions, more so than in others, the remedy is crucial. Where
a choice of effective remedies exists, the least oppressive is to be decreed, but
with only one effective remedy, its harshness will not be reason to choose a less
adequate one.33 The remedy chosen must eliminate the cause as well as the
resulting illegal tendency to restraint, and "go beyond the narrow limits of the
proven violation."3 4 The cause of the illegal tendency to restrain competition
was du Pont's ownership of General Motors stock. As long as this ownership
continued, there would be a constant motive for anti-competitive inter-company
favoritism. Hence, complete divestiture of its ownership was the only effective
remedy.
The tax consequences of complete divestiture are obviously severe. Under
the present law the General Motors stock distributed by du Pont to its share-
holders will be taken at its fair market value and then added to the declared
income of the du Pont shareholder on his income tax return.3 Thus the
"dividend" would have to be taxed according to the tax bracket of the share-
holder (from twenty per cent to ninety-one per cent) in a year picked, not by
the taxpayer, but by du Pont or some court appointed trustee. The resultant
tax comes close to being a punishment, but, what is more, it is a hindrance to
30. Actually the general market situation is much improved, and du Pont, which was
selling at $220 per share on May 19 closed at $235 on August 21, 1961. See N.Y. Times,
Aug. 22, 1961, (Financial), p. 38, col. 4; id. May 20, 1961 (Financial), p. 27, col. 5.
31. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726 (19,14); Local
167, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 299 (1934).
32. Furthermore, since its decree was fashioned in obedience to the Supreme Court's
judgment reversing that lower court's dismissal of all charges, the Court has plenary power
to review completely in determining whether its judgment had been executed fully and
scrupulously by the district court.
33. 366 U.S. at 328.
34. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 90 (1950).
35. "On May 9, 1958 the Commissioner ruled as follows ... : The General Motors stock
distributed by du Pont would be taxable to its stockholders as dividend income. For
du Pont's non-corporate stockholders, the fair market value of General Motors stock on
date of distribution would be the measure of the income received. For du Pont's tax-
paying corporate stockholders, du Pont's tax basis for its General Motors stock (about
$2.09 a share . . .) would be the measure of the income received." Brief for United




the proper enforcement of the antitrust laws. For, even where the circum-
stances demand it, courts are hesitant to order a divestiture which they deem
harsh,' or "extraordinarily difficult and expensive. ''37 When Mr. Justice
Douglas was Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission he testified:
[O]ur big job at the Commission is to put the private utility house in order. We
think we can do it expeditiously and constructively if this tax barrier is removed ....
We down at the Commission do not desire to put the gun at the head of a utility
company and say "transfer these," and then have another branch of the Federal
Government collect $2,000,000. or $1000. or $250,000. as a result of doing what w.e
are forcing it to do.3 8
Should not court-ordered sales be entitled to special tax treatment and special
relief?
When, as in this case, the proper decree of divestiture might mean the
forfeiture of as much as one billion dollars in taxes-about one-third of the
value of the General Motors stock held by du Pont-revision of the tax laws,
to take court ordered sales into account, for the benefit of both the shareholder
so affected, and of free competition seems necessary.29
36. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, C07 (1951).
37. United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 935, 370 (D.NJ. 1953). See also
Report of the Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. to Study the Antitrust Law-, March 31, 1955, p. 354.
38. Hearings on H.R. 9632 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 75th Cong, 3d
Sess., pt. 12, at 73 (1938).
39. A letter from C. H. Greenewalt, President, to the Stoholders of du Pont, Aug. 14,
1961, stating in part: "Several bills are pending in Congrcs. The one which appaars to
have the most favorable chance to become law was introduceid by Senator. Williams of
Delaware and Bennett of Utah as S. 2266, and by Representative Mason of IllinoiL as HR.
3190.... As you know, we began urging Congress in 1953 to enact corrcctive legflation.
The first bills, supported by precedents established by Congrcz3 in connction with the
Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Bank Holding Company Act, would have
permitted Du Pont to divest by distributing the G.M. Etocl: at little or no tax to you.
.. The new bills taLe a different approach. For tax purposes, they would treat a stod:
distribution pursuant to an antitrust order-like ours--as a return of capital to the
individual stockholder. . . .If Congress approves this legislation, the Du Pont Company
could distribute G.M. shares to you without the market consquences which w uld Le
inevitable under present law, even though some shares would have to be !old for tax
purposes. I believe the distribution could be carried out without tax for a majority of our
stockholders--including 50,000 of our 37,000 employees. The remaining individual Etock-
holders--principally those who acquired Du Pont shares prior to 1949 when they firzt
sold for as much as $60 a share--would be subject to a capital gains tLx at the time
of distribution. We estimate these taxes, plus those paid by corporate stockholder:, would
total about $350 million. To sum up, unless Congress enacts corrective legizlation, you
will suffer severe economic loss through any method available to Du Pont in divesting
its 63 million shares of G.M. stock."
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Conflict of Laws-Limitation on Damages for Wrongful Death Against
Public Policy.-Plaintiff's intestate, a New York domiciliary, was killed in a
plane crash in Nantucket, Massachusetts. An action was brought against
defendant carrier in contract and tort, the former quite obviously to escape the
$15,000 limitation specified in the Massachusetts wrongful death statute. 1
The appellate division, reversing the trial court,2 granted defendant's motion
to dismiss the contract count. The court of appeals in affirming stated, in a
strong dictum, that the $15,000 limitation need not be applied, since It was
contrary to the public policy of New York. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
Where a tort occurs in one state and the action is brought in another, tradi-
tional conflict of laws rules require that the substantive law of the locus delicti
be applied by the forum.' Exceptions to this rule occur where the cause of
action is contrary to the public policy of the forum 4 or the forum lacks the
adequate judicial machinery to grant relief,a in either of which event the action
need not be entertained. Procedure, on the other hand, is governed by the rules
of the forum,6 and it is the forum which determines whether or not a matter
is procedural. 7
With respect to wrongful death actions, the overwhelming weight of authority
supports the view that a limitation on a measure of damages, contained in the
statute of the locus delicti, is a part of the substantive right and will be enforced
by the forum.' New York took exception to this view in Wooden v. Western
1. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 229, § 2 (1955). "If the proprietor of a common carrier of
passengers . . . by reason of . . . its negligence . . . causes the death of a passenger . . . it
shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less than two thousand nor more than fifteen
thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defend-
ant. . . ." This section has been amended effective Jan. 1, 1959. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
229, § 2 (Supp. 1960).
2. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 261, 198 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Ist Dep't
1960) (per curiam).
3. Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E.2d 412 (1945); Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge
Co., 197 N.Y. 316, 90 N.E. 953 (1910); In the Matter of Estate of Petrasek, 191 Misc. 9,
79 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Surr. Ct. 1948). Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 391-92 (1934).
4. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Coster v. Coster, 289
N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
5. Slater v. Mexican Nat'1 R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
6. Murray v. New York, Ont. & W.R.R., 242 App. Div. 374, 376, 275 N.Y. Supp. 10,
12 (1st Dep't 1934); 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws §§ 584.1-4.2 (1935); Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws §§ 80-81 (3d ed. 1949).
7. Authorities cited note 6 supra.
8. The issue was foreclosed in the federal courts in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown,
234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914). See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 765 (1951) for the states in accord;
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 391, comment b (1934). Contra, Higgins v. Central New
England & W. R.R., 155 Mass. 176, 29 N.E. 534 (1892) (dictum). Courts have limited
recoveries in accord with their own laws but under a principle of waiver and not pro-
cedure. Armbruster v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 166 Iowa 155, 147 N.W. 337 (1914);
Rochester v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, 87 Kan. 164, 123 Pac. 729 (1912) (punitive
damages waived). See also Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, 248 Mich. 85, 226 N.W.
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N.Y. & Penn. R.R.0 where it was stated that the limitation contained in the
New York statute restricting the amount recoverable in wrongful death actions
was procedural.' Shortly thereafter, the New York constitution was amended
to strike the statutory limitation and prohibit any monetary restrictions in
such actions.11 The most often cited case for a rejection of the Wooden reason-
ing is Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.'2 Lozcks, however, did not overrule Wooden,
but merely suggested that its authority be restricted.13 The instant court seized
upon this point and stated that whether the measure of damages was substantive
or procedural was an open question,'4 but then, adding another dictum as well
as elliptical logic, reasoned that since the limitation was contrary to public
policy, it would characterize the measure of damages as procedral.15 It there-
upon concluded that the Massachusetts limitation need not be applied. This
conclusion, however, has left in doubt the law to be applied with respect to the
weasure of damages. If the measure of damages is procedural, as the court
implied, the law of New York is applicable. If, as may be inferred from its
conclusion, the court merely intended to characterize the limitation as pro-
cedural, the measure of damages to be applied is that of Massachusetts. In that
event, the measure of damages is calculated with reference to the degree of cul-
pability of the defendant, and not, as in New York, with reference to the
pecuniary loss of the plaintiff. 1 The confusion is due in part to the court's
use of the terms "measure of damages" and "limitation" interchangeably. Tak-
ing together the court's treatment of public policy and of the procedural issue
it would appear, however, that the court intended to excL-e the limitation in the
Massachusetts statute.
In discussing public policy the court reasoned that the New York constitution
was amended to prohibit any limitation on the amount recoverable under the
S33 (1929) (lex led contractus determines right of recovery and lex for the rule of
damages).
9. 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1S91).
10. Id. at 17, 26 N.E. at 1051. The action was prcdicatcd on a Pennyl%-anla statute
which did not have a limitation.
11. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1349, ch. 256, § 1 provided for a $5 ,S limitation on vwrongful
death actions which was subsequently removed by N.Y. Coast. art. I, § 13 (:94), now
art. I, § 16.
12. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (191s).
13. Id. at 109, 120 N.E. at 201.
14. See Isola v. Weber, 147 N.Y. 329, 41 N.E. 704 (1.95) (limitation is substantive);
Royal Indem. Co. v. Atchison, T & S.F. Ry., 272 App. Div. 246, 70 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Ist Dcp't),
aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 619, 75 N.E.2d 631 (1947) (locus delicti is not only the ground of
recovery but measure of damages); Kiefer v. Grand Trunk Ry., 12 App. Div. 23 (4th Dcp't
1896), aff'd mem., 153 N.Y. 6S3, 4S N.E. 1105 (1S97) (mcasure of damag.. is substantive).
See also Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 457, 199 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 19M0)
(Wooden rule e.apressly rejected); Tobinick v. Checker Tadcab Co., 12 Misc. 2d 724, 174
N.YS.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (Illinois statutory limit controlled). Federal cijurts censtruing
New York law are in accord. Frasier v. Public Service Intcrtate Tranp. Co., 254 F.2d 132
(2d Cir. 1958); Mlaynard v. Eastern Airlines, 178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949).
15. 9 N.Y.2d at 41, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.YS.2d at 137.
16. Compare N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 130, vith Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 29, § 2 (1955).
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New York wrongful death statute because it was unjust to measure "the pecuniary
values of all lives, to the next of kin, by the same arbitrary standard." 17 This
rationale is valid today, the court continued, and it is, therefore, contrary to
New York public policy to enforce the Massachusetts damage ceiling.18 Un-
fortunately the court's readiness to strike the limitation provision leaves un-
solved the problem encountered in applying the Massachusetts culpability rule
as a measure of damages.
The court overlooked two significant factors. First, while the rationale for
prohibiting limitations may be valid where the damages are compensatory, it
is questionable if it can be applied where damages are assessed with reference
to the culpability of the defendant. The Massachusetts act does not seek to
measure the pecuniary value of an individual to his next of kin, but seeks to
punish the defendant for his negligence by imposing a liability upon him,
irrespective of any pecuniary loss suffered by the beneficiaries of the deceased.
It is clear that the reasoning which sustains the prohibitions of limitations on
wrongful death actions arising in New York is not applicable where the limita-
tion in a foreign statute is founded on a completely different theory.
Secondly, Loucks had the same statute before it and found "nothing in the
Massachusetts statute that outrages the public policy of New York."'1 Since
public policy is an ever changing concept, the court may well decide that the
Loucks view is no longer tenable, but it should at least state reasons for its re-
jection of that view.
The present decision would seem to lack consistency. To hold the limitation
contrary to public policy is, in effect, to characterize the limitation as substan-
tive. For public policy is a reason advanced to deny effect to the substantive
law of the locus delicti. If the issue in question were procedural, it was one to
be decided by the forum's law and considerations of public policy had no place
in the discussion. The court, it is to be noted, did not decide the case by posing
alternatives-public policy reasoning or a characterization of the Massachusetts
limitation as procedural-for refusing to enforce the limitation, but coalesced
the two into a single approach and left it distinctly unclear whether a limitation
on recovery found in a wrongful death statute will now be considered a matter
of procedure in New York or whether it will be rejected for reasons of public
policy. It is true that the result, under the facts here presented, would be the
same in either case regardless of the alternative selected for rejecting the
Massachusetts limitation. But that is so only because New York was the forum-
thus permitting the application of New York's procedural law-and New York
was also the domicile of the decedent-thus sanctioning the imposition of New
York's public policy. But what right, it might validly be asked, would New
York have to apply its public policy if the decedent were not a domiciliary of
New York? The pertinency of New York's public policy to a non-domiciliary
would be all the more unrealistic if the law of the decedent's domicile were
17. 9 N.Y.2d at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
18. The court indicated that this protection would extend only to New York domiciliaries.
Id. at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
19. 224 N.Y. at 111, 120 N.E. at 202.
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identical to the law of Massachusetts. It would seem incongruous for New
York to reject--on public policy grounds-a limitation imposed by both the
locus delicli and the decedent's last domicile. Yet if a limitation on damages
is classified as a matter of procedure, then, following traditional conflicts rules,
both the law of the locus delicti and that of the decedent's domicile become
irrelevant because New York as the forum would have the right to apply its
own procedural rules.
The traditional place of injury rule which would compel the forum to apply
the law of the locus ddicti has not escaped attack by both the judiciary2 ' and
legal commentators. 21 Some courts have rejected the rule outright, giving the
plaintiff a cause of action where none existed at the locus dclicti- The justifi-
cation for such action was the sufficiency of the contacts which the forum had
with the parties to the action. This reasoning, which would enable a court to
create a liability where none existed at the locus delicti, has a definite per-
suasiveness to it. If the court were free to apply its own law where it had suffi-
cient contacts, it would be necessary neither to resort to the device of labelling
segments of a foreign statute nor to rest its result on ill-defined considerations
of public policy. Thus, in the instant case, the court would be free to reject
the Massachusetts measure of damages as well as the Massachusetts limitation
on damages and apply its own law were sufficient contacts found.
Constitutional Law-Evidence Obtained by State Officers in Violation of
Fourteenth Amendment Inadmissible in State Court.-Appellant was con-
ricted in an Ohio court of possession of lewd and lascivious books, pictures and
photographs in violation of a state criminal statute.' The conviction vias ob-
tained primarily on the strength of evidence seized by state officers in the course
of an unlawful search of appellant's home.2 The United States Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The rule excluding relevant evidence in a criminal trial because it had been
20. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 MAinn. 376, S2 N.NVd 365 (1957) (liability
predicated on forum's statute although no liability at the locus dclicti). Similarly in
Noel v. Airponents, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 343 (DN.J. 1953), a w.-rongful death action, the
court refused to apply maritime rules where no liability would have resultcd.
21. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws, 303-70 (1947); StumLri., Con-
flict of Laws, 201-12 (2d ed. 1951); Beale, Social Justice and Business CoAtn, 49 Harv. L.
Rex. 593 (1936) (offers a theory of rationalization); Harper, Policy Bascs of the Conflict
of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's E myay, 56 Yale L.J. 1155, 1161
(1947) (importance of sufficient contacts); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, t,4 Harv. L,
Rev. S81 (1951) ; Stumberg, Torts and the Conflict of Law.s, 34 Wash. L, Rev. 3113 1959).
22. See cases cited note 20 supra.
1. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.34 (1953) (Supp. 1960).
2. State v. .Napp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 337 (1960).
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illegally obtained by the police was unknown at common law.8 In federal
courts, however, introduction of evidence seized by federal4 or state officers
in an unlawful search,6 as well as any indirect use of such evidence,7 has long
been prohibited. 8 Until the instant decision, the state judiciary was unaffected
by the federal exclusionary policy,9 except that a federal officer could be en-
joined from transferring illegally seized evidence to state authorities or from
testifying thereto in a state criminal trial. 10 But with respect to state admission
of evidence obtained by state officers in violation of the fourteenth amendment,
federal injunctive relief was denied." In the meantime, the states themselves
differed widely regarding adoption of the exclusionary rule as well as the extent
of adherence to the federal policy.'
2
3. At common law, logically relevant evidence was admissible without regard to the
collateral issue of the means by which it was obtained. 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2183-86
(McNaughten rev. 1961); see People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
S. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), 29 Fordham L. Rev. 381.
6. In Elkins, supra note 5, the Court held the same federal test applicable In the case
of state officers as that used to determine whether federal officers bad Illegally obtained
evidence introduced in a federal court.
7. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ("fruIt-of-posonous
tree doctrine").
8. With respect to searches conducted without a search warrant, the "reasonableness" of
the search is adjudged according to certain exceptions and the particular circumstances of
the case. It is accepted law that a search incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to the premises under his immediate control. However, this
rule is modified by the prohibition against general, exploratory searches for Incriminating
evidence. The application of the rule to specific cases has resulted in some confusion and
occasional inconsistencies. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 (1931); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
9. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
While illegally obtained evidence was held admissible in state courts, the fourteenth amend-
ment was held to bar the use of evidence obtained by coercion and brutality to the person
such as to "shock the conscience" and offend "a sense of justice." Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). However, this decision is unique and its principle is peculiar to the
circumstances of the case, the evidence having been obtained through physical assault upon
the person of the defendant.
10. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). But see Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S.
381 (1961) (memorandum decision).
11. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123 (1951). See Note, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 586
(1961).
12. See, e.g., Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). The federal exclusionary rule
also prohibits introduction of evidence obtained via wiretapping in violation of a federal
statute, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958); see Benanti v. United States, 355
U.S. 96 (1957). However, state use of wiretap evidence is not barred by federal law.
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); see Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961).
The result has been a maze of state legislation varying from complete prohibition to a
system of limited law enforcement wiretapping. See Hearings on Wiretapping, Eavesdrop.
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The present decision marks the inevitable step from the Court's rejection of
the "silver platter" doctrine in Elkins v. United States13 to the imposition of
the Weeks' 4 exclusionary rule on the state judiciary. The basic theme of that
transition was the gradual elimination of any distinction in the treatment of the
guaranties of privacy under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. "Eclusion"
was adopted by the Court in 1914 as the "only sound deterrent" against pro-
curement of evidence by federal agents through means violative of the fourth
amendment.10  The same Court, however, refused to prohibit federal prosecu-
tors from using state-seized evidence, on the ground that the fourth amendment
was not directed to the individual misconduct of state officers.10 But in
Woll v. Colorado, decided in 1949, the Supreme Court avowed that the
right of privacy which is at the "core" of the fourth amendment, vas
embodied in "the concept of ordered liberty," and, therefore, enforceable
against the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' 7 At the same time, this basic right to protection against
"arbitrary intrusion" by state officers was held not to prohibit state admission
of logically relevant evidence obtained in the course of the unlawful search. 13
The basis for this decision was that the fundamental guaranty of privacy secured
by the due process clause was not co-extensive with the specific restrictive pro-
tections of the fourth amendment and, therefore, not governed by federal
precedents regarding those protections.19 The Court also expressed doubt
whether the Weeks exclusionary rule, in any event, v.as a constitutional require-
ment rather than a policy emanating from the Court's supervisory power re-
specting evidence used in federal courts.20 Thus the fundamental right of
privacy embodied in the due process clause would require a separate standard
and independent evaluation of the conduct of state officers without reference
to the body of law surrounding the fourth amendment. Therefore, that which
was deemed necessary to enforce the specific provisions of the fourth amend-
ping, and the Bill of Rights Before the Subcommitte of the Senate Committe on the
judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, app., 35-39 (1953).
13. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 3S3 (1914).
15. Id. at 393.
16. Id. at 393.
17. 33S U.. 25, 27 (1949).
13. Ibid. However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, did state that:
"[WUIere a state affirmatively to sanction such police incurzion into privacy it would run
counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 28. Short of such afrma-
tive sanction, the states could have passively admitted illk-ally sdzed evidence in ctate
courts.
19. Id. at 26.
20. While the Court recognized the exclusionary rule to he a judicially implivl con.
stitutional requirement, it was stated that a different quection would he precnted "if
Congress under its legislative powers were to pass a s:tatute" exprc--ly permitting the
admission of such evidence. Id. at 33. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blac!, too!: the
view that the rule was one of eidence and not a constitutional mandate. Id. at 39; ze
discussion in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 232 P.2d 905 (1955).
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ment might not be required under the flexible standards of due process to
insure compliance with the "core" of the fourth amendment.
21
This constitutional distinction was abandoned in 1960 when the Court
again considered the propriety of admitting in a federal prosecution evidence
seized by state officers in the course of an unlawful search.22 Citing Wolf as
authority, the Court first declared that the same right of privacy secured by the
fourth amendment against arbitrary police intrusion was embodied in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 3 Secondly, the federal exclusionary
rule was construed to be a constitutional mandate, and not merely a judicially
created rule of evidence. 24 Therefore the conduct of state officers in the pro-
curement of evidence was subject to the same scrutiny and restrictions demanded
by the fourth amendment in order to enforce the guaranty of privacy under the
fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, the decision to exclude the state-seized
evidence was finally rested on the narrower ground of the Court's supervisory
power to prescribe federal rules of evidence.23 Accordingly, evidence obtained by
state officers, in a search which would violate the fourth amendment if
conducted by federal officers, was held inadmissible in federal courts. Thus the
present decision merely affirms the dictum in Elkins by squarely holding that
the due process clause renders inadmissible evidence obtained in violation of
that same constitutional provision.2 6
The instant case is in line with the established policy of the present Court
regarding application of the due process clause. The Wolf decision itself
recognized the Court's power to go beyond existing precedents and to extend
the prevailing limits of the principle of due process by redefining its scope."7
21. 338 U.S. at 28-33.
22. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
23. Id. at 213. The Court ignored the Wolf distinction between the requirements of tile
fourth amendment and the requirements of the core of that amendment as embodied in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Note, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 381, 382 (1960).
24. 364 U.S. at 213-14.
25. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 26, governing admissibility of evidence and rights of witnesses
in federal courts, the Court ruled that federal law would be the test of admissibility of
state-obtained evidence in federal courts. Prior to the Elkins decision, state seized evidence
was admissible in federal court unless seized by a state officer solely on behalf of the
federal government, Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); or illegally obtained
through the participation of federal officers, Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) ; see
Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) ; Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) ;
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). See also Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96,
102 (1957).
26. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. "Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements.
It is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because
they are basic to our free society .... It is of the very nature of a free society to advance
in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living
principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given
time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights. . . . [The standard of
due process] is to be drawn by the gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and exclusion.'"
338 U.S. at 27. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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"The gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and exclusion'" approved in
Wolf2 s did not bar extension of the doctrine of exclusion to the states, if that
rule was, as the Court held, a constitutional command. -9 From a practical
standpoint it is an absurdity that the enforcement of the same constitutional
guaranty should be measured against a double standard depending on jurisdic-
tion. To insist that due process must remain that vague principle embodying
all that is implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" ' 30 without further
definition and specificity belies the reality of a single constitution, guarantying
certain and specific rights to the individual. If the present decision has the
disadvantage of crystallizing the guaranty of privacy previously lodged in
the "undefined range" of due process,ai it has the advantage of eliminating the
inexplicable dichotomy of two distinct standards for protection of the same right.
Essentially that which divides the Court on the present issue is not confined
to the wisdom of extending a federal application of the fourth amendment to
the states. The real question, once it is conceded that a right guarantied in
the first eight amendments is enforceable against the states through the due
process clause, is whether the traditional generalities of due process are to be
exchanged for the specific safeguards of the appropriate provision of the Bill
of Rights. The dissenters argue that the scope and effect of these distinct
constitutional provisions cannot be equated. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said
that the "basic principles" underlying the specific guaranties of the Bill of Rights
are "implied limitations" upon the states,-2 but not the particular protections
spelled out therein. Under this view, the standard of due process is said to be
"civilized conduct" and not federal precedents respecting the Bill of Rights.P
The ultimate result of this double standard concept has been a watered-down
version of rights under due process as compared with the specific protections
of the same right under the first eight amendments, and consequent confusion
in application. 24 In Elkins3" and in the present decision the majority has clearly
rejected any such interpretation which would permit a less stringent enforccment
of rights under due process.
28. 338 U.S. at 27.
29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). While the Court held that the exdhiona-ry rule
is an essential ingredient of the right of privacy embodied in the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, the Court also relied on the theory that the rule is a constitutional command
resulting from the interplay of the fourth and fifth amendmcnts. This approach, firt men-
tioned in dictum in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (126), is based on the pr.mL that
admission of illegally seized evidence violates the privilege apinst self incrimination. Ste
Daxis v. United States, 323 U.S. 532 (1946). But see Adams v. Newv York, 192 US. 535
(1904).
30. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319, 325 (1937).
31. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123 (1951).
32. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
33. Ibid.
34. See WiLon v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 US. 3O
(1959); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 123 (1953);
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Lustig v. United State-, 333 U.S. 74 (1949).
35. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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Corporations-Liability of an Insider and His Investment Partnership
for Profits Realized on a Short Swing Speculation.-Lehman Brothers, an
investment partnership, purchased 50,000 shares of the common stock of the
Tide Water Oil Company with the purpose of converting to dividend-paying
preferred stock' and selling the latter at a profit. Before the purchase was
completed one of the partners of Lehman Brothers, who was serving as a
director of the Tide Water Corporation, waived his share of contemplated profits
from the venture. The partnership completed the purchase, converted the
common stock to preferred, and within six months sold the stock and realized
a profit. A stockholder of Tide Water brought this derivative suit under section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 to recover the "short swing"
profits from both the director and his stock brokerage firm. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an investment firm, a partner of
which is a director of a corporation, is not liable under section 16(b) for "short
swing" profits realized from the purchase and sale of that corporation's stock,
but that the partner-director, despite his waiver, is liable to the corporation
for the proportionate share of the profits "realized" by him. Blau v. Lehman,
286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 902 (1961).
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act embodies an objective standard
to be rigidly applied in order to prevent stock manipulation by fiduciaries of a
corporation to whom confidential information is available and "might be used.""
Under this statute a corporation can recover all profits realized 4 by "in-
1. The board of directors of Tide Water had approved a proposal to allow share-
holders to exchange common stock for new dividend paying preferred stock. 286 F.2d
at 788.
2. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958), provides in part: "For the purpose
of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such bene-
ficial owner [of over 10% of stock], director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase,
of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any
period of less than six months ... shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, Irre-
spective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in enter-
ing into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months. .. ."
3. "We must suppose that the statute was intended to be thoroughgoing, to squeeze
all possible profits out of stock transactions, and thus to establish a standard so high as
to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stock-
holder and the faithful performance of his duty." Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). See also Park & Tilford, Inc. v.
Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
4. In Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra note 3, at 239, the rule was set forth for
measuring the profits realized: "The only rule whereby all possible profits can be surely
recovered is that of lowest price in, highest price out-within six months. . . ." "Under
this rule, the profits are calculated in the following fashion: Listed in one column are all
the purchases made during the period for which recovery of profits is sought. In another
column is listed all of the sales during that period. Then the shares purchased at the
lowest price are matched against an equal number of the shares sold at the highest price
within six months of such purchase, and the profit computed. After that the next lowest
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siders' 'a from purchases and sales of that corporation's stock0 within a period
of six monthsY No question of intention or subjective good faith is raised by
the statute, and a corporation may recover such profits even though there had
been no actual use of confidential information by the fiduciary.8 On the other
hand, no matter how much proof of the unfair use of inside information is
offered, liabilit, is restricted to the six month, "short swing" profito and affects
only "insiders" as that term is defined in the statute.10 Thus the statute offers
no guaranty against evasion of its purpose by the exchange of non-public
price is matched against the next highest price and that profit is computed. Then, the
same process is repeated until all the shares in the purchase column which may L-a matched
against shares sold for higher prices in the sales column have heen matched off. Where
necessary to accurate computation, it would seem proper to split a larger denomination
or lot of shares in order to match off part of the lot 3gaircst an equal amount on the
other side. The gross recovery is the sum of the profits thus decrmined."1 Rubin &
Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by In:idcr,
95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 468, 4S2-33 (1947). The court concluded that this rule va ez:-ential to
achieve the purpose of the statute. If the "first in first out" rule of accounting Were
used to figure the profit realized, then insiders who owned large amounts of the corpora-
tion's stock could obtain a short swing profit without liability by selling only stock held
longer than six months. If the average cost system of accounting were used then those
who had bought large amounts of stock previously at a high rate could be said to have
made no profit. E.g., insider A owns ten shares of XYZ Company stock which be bought
at $10 a share and which is now worth only $5 a share. He then buys one more share at
$5 and sells within six months at $6. Under the average cost rule, since the average co:t
of the stock to him was $9.60, he has made no profit. All dividcnds received v ithin this
period are also included in accounting the profits realized, thereby removing all oppor-
tunity for profit by the insider. See Meeker & Cooncy, The Problem of Dfinition in
Determining Insider Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 Va. L. Rev. 949, 954 (1959).
S. An "insider" is defined in § 16 as a director, officer or beneficial owner of over 10%
of the stock of the corporation.
6. Section 16(b) only applies to stock registered on a National Securities Eachange.
7. Cf. Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate Comm. and Foreign Comm.
on H.R. 752 & H.R. S720, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1934). "That [section 16(b)] is
simply an application of an old principle of the law that if you are an agent and you
profit by inside information concerning the affairs of your principal, your profits go to
your principal."
8. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, SZ0 US. 751
(1943); see Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cc.rL denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959) ; Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d S43 (2d Cir.), ccrL dcnied, 351
US. 972 (1956); Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463, 46S (9th Cir. 1953); Walct v. Jeffer-
son Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir.), ccrL denied, 346 U.S. SZ0 (1953);
Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) ; Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 56 & S. 97, 73rd Cong,, 1st
and 2d Sess. 6557 (1934) where it is said: "You hold the director, irrezpective of any in.
tention . . . because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existcnce of ouch intcn-
tion or expectation... "
9. See note 2 supra.
10. See note 3 supra.
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information among insiders of different corporations, or the transfer of such
knowledge to associates and relatives trading in such stock.'"
The majority of cases interpreting section 16(b) have been concerned with
the simple form of "short swing" transactions in which the insider was the only
person to make a profit.12 However, the courts have uniformly described the
statute as a "broadly remedial" measure, designed to protect outside share-
holders against insider trading by squeezing "all possible profits out of [insider]
stock transactions.' 3 Nevertheless, in Rattner v. Lehman,' 4 the only other case
involving facts similar to those of the instant case, the court refused to extend
the remedy of section 16(b) beyond its literal application. There it was held
that neither the partnership nor the partner,", who served as director of the
11. See H.R. 7852, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The original draft of the bill Included
a provision [15(b)(3)1 forbidding any director, etc. "to disclose, directly or indirectly,
any confidential information regarding or affecting any such registered security not nec-
essary or proper to be disclosed as a part of his corporate duties. Any profit made by any
person, to whom such unlawful disclosure shall have been made, in respect of any transac-
tion or transactions in such registered security within a period not exceeding six months
after such disclosure shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer unless such person
shall have had no reasonable ground to believe that the disclosure was confidential or was
made not in the performance of corporate duties." Hearings, op. cit. supra note 7, at 9. The
purpose of the above omitted section was to enable the corporation to sue a non-insider
who had made a profit due to information given him by an insider. "That is the director
can not evade having to turn over his own profit under section 15 [now 16(b)] by
tipping off somebody else to do the job for him, nor can he tip off a friend, or friends,
and let them make a killing on inside information at the expense of other people." Id. at
135. There followed a debate on whether it would be practically possible to discover
whether a director had tipped off the seller, and the sponsors conceded that perhaps only
5% of the cases could be caught. The section was, therefore, deleted due to the practical
impossibility of enforcing it. Congress thus had no intention of covering transactions
involving use of inside information by non-insiders merely because these people were so
closely associated with the insider as to be able to get inside information. Something
more was necessary. See Loss, Securities Regulation 564 (1951).
12. See cases cited in note 8 supra. But see Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp.
387, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) which stated in a dictum that where the person who sold the
stock did so within six months of its purchase by the director who then transferred It
to him, the director should be held liable for the profit, if it appeared that this donee
was the alter ego of the director.
13. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943). As an example of how far the courts have extended liability see Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959) (insider held liable for profits realized on sale of
stock purchased prior to his becoming a director); Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872
(2d Cir. 1949). In the latter case, a corporate employee, not an officer of the company,
but "performing important executive duties of such character that he would be likely, In
discharging these duties, to obtain confidential information . . ." was found to be an
"insider" under § 16(b). Id. at 873.
14. 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
15. The defendant firm in Rattner, supra note 14, was the same Lehman Brothers
appearing as defendant in the principal case. The defendant partner in Rattner was the
predecessor of the present defendant partner as a director of Tide Water.
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corporation, was liable for the "short swing" profits realized by the firm. The
decision was based on the "plain meaning" of the statute10 and its legislative
history which revealed the deletion of a provision in an earlier draft of section
16(b) which made any person liable who had acted on confidential information
from a director.17 On the basis of the deletion of this subjective standard of
liability for persons other than "insiders" the court reasoned that Congress had
intentionally omitted investment partnerships from liability for short swing
profits under section 16(b).1s
In a concurring opinion in Rattner, Judge Learned Hand intimated that a
different result might have been reached had it been established that the firm
had "deputed a partner to represent its interests as a director on the board.
. Where such "deputizing" was established, the court would not be
precluded from considering the firm an "insider" within the meaning of sec-
tion 16(b) on the theory that a partnership under certain circumstances may be
treated as a "jural person." '
In the instant decision, the majority was content to abide by the strict ap-
plication of the statute as adopted in Rattncr.21 The legislative historya
and the arbitrary nature of the test of liability embodied in the statute clearly
support a strict interpretation. There is no provision in the statute to curb
the transfer and use of confidential information by non-insiders.23
It is clear that extension of the section's objective test would involve
questions of both interpretation and policy. It is interesting to note in this
regard that the court denied the Securities and Exchange Comnission's petition
to participate as amicus curiae, thus indicating that application of a strict
standard of accountability to persons associated with a director in an invest-
ment partnership would be a question for the legislature rather than the
judiciary.2 4  In view of this attitude, the only logical alternative for the
16. "Section 16(b) contains no provision requiring the partners of a dircctor to account
for profits realized by them." 193 F.2d at 566.
17. See note 11 supra.
18. "[T]he legislative history indicates that the omizsion of any proviion for Euch
liability was intentional." 193 F.2d at 566.
19. Id. at 567.
20. Ibid.
21. 286 F.2d 786, 7S9-90 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 902 (1961).
22. See note 11 supra.
23. Ibid.
24. At the time of the Rattner decision, the Commission Rule EX 16 A-3(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-3(b) (1949)] required that a partner need diclose only his proportional share
of the corporate stock held by his investment partnership. The Commision as amicus
curiae in Rattner argued that the rule impliedly excepted the firm itsclf from liability
under § 16(b). The court rejected this possibility and held that the firm did not come
under § 16(b). The Commission subsequently amended Rule X 16 A-3 to require the
partner to report the entire amount of security owned by the partncrzhip. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-3(b) (Supp. 1961). It is now clear that the position of the Commis:ion on




court would have been the "deputed" director theory which was indicated by
Judge Hand in the Rattner decision.25 The majority, however, rejected this
dictum, reasoning that no amount of "deputizing" of partners could render the
partnership itself a "director" within the meaning of section 16(b). 0O
Whatever may be the propriety of this conclusion, certainly the insertion by
judicial implication of this subjective element into the statutory test is open
to the same criticism which dictated the objective form of the final enactment
of section 16(b), i.e., the practical impossibility of enforcing a subjective
standard of liability.27 The legislative history, however, does not warrant the
court's conclusion that investment firms were "intentionally" omitted from the
coverage of the statute2 8 The omission of investment firms having access to
inside information through representation on boards of directors appears
to be rather a legislative oversight than an intentional exception.
It is clear that the partnership itself cannot be considered a director. How-
ever, as indicated by Judge Clark,29 a partner, under New York law is a tenant
in common with the other members of the firm and hence is deemed to have an
undivided interest in the entire partnership profits.30 "[I) t may thus be said
that each 'realizes' the entire profit [within the meaning of section 16(b)],
subject only to division at periodic intervals."31 Such a construction would
permit recovery of the entire profit by the corporation and thus preclude the
real possibility of circumvention in an area of stock trading where incentive
to use inside information is strongest.82
A requirement of strict accountability from corporate fiduciaries is by no
25. 193 F.2d at 566-67.
26. 286 F.2d at 789.
27. See note 11 supra. The difficulty in applying this theory is manifested In the
instant case. The majority and the dissent disagree as to the degree of proof necessary
to establish deputization. The majority would require a showing of "affirmative action"
by the firm to cause the partner to be made a director. 286 F.2d at 789. The dissent
argued that the mere fact of the "mutually beneficial management" was sufficient to
establish the firm's liability under section 16(b). Id. at 795.
28. See note 11 supra.
29. 286 F.2d at 794.
30. N.Y. Partnership Law § 51. See also Uniform Partnership Act § 25.
31. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under The Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 612, 629 (1953). Mr. Cook is a former Chairman of the SEC. See Walet v.
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953),
where an insider who engaged in short swing trading was held liable for all profit
realized despite the fact that he claimed his wife had an undivided one-half interest in
the profits under the law of a community property state.
32. It would be naive to doubt that investment partnerships will make use of available
inside information. Though the individual partner-director will lose his share of the
profits in a transaction involving his corporation's stock, the high percentage of profit
realized by the firm as a whole will more than offset this personal disadvantage. Moreover,
a firm may be represented on several boards of directors by its partners, and thus a
system of mutual exchange of non-public information concerning various corporations
might be utilized to circumvent the effect of the present decision.
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means unprecedented. It has been held,33 for e.'ample, in a reorganization
proceeding, that the firm of an attorney whose wife, acting without benefit
of any inside information, had bought stock of the bankrupt company, was
disqualified from receiving compensation for its services under section 249 of
the Bankruptcy ActP4 If the court in the present case doubted the vsdom of
such a policy toward investment firms, certainly its refusal of the SEC's peti-
tion to be heard regarding the judicial interpretation of the rule was ill-ad-
vised.35 The increased probability of conflicts of interest where corporate
fiduciaries are members of stock investment firms and of banhing houses
heightens proportionately the need for protection against insider trading
at this level.30
Criminal Law-lnsanity as a Defense to a Federal Criminal Charge.-De-
fendant, who had pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, was convicted of a
violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act.' The United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania charged the jury concerning
the defendant's criminal responsibility in terms of the M'Naghten rules, in
addition commenting on temporary insanity and irresistible impulse. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that there existed nco
satisfactory test of insanity; that the jury must be presented with under-
standable evidence of defendant's mental condition and provided with a stand-
ard with which to judge the evidence thus given. The court, in a partial applica-
tion of the test of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code,2 held
proof that defendant, as a result of mental disease, so lacked control of his
actions as to be unable to conform them to accepted standards of behavior, to
constitute a defense of insanity. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d
Cir. 1961).
Few problems have provoked as much discussion as that of the legal re-
sponsibility of persons afflicted with mental disease, mental deficiency, or other
form of mental abnormality. In early England such an individual was regarded
as possessed of demons; one was not criminally responsible if unable to distin-
guish good or evil, or as justice Tracy3 so cruelly put it: "[if he] doth not
33. Surface Transportation, Inc. v. Saxe, Bacon & O'Shca, 266 F.2d 162 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 862 (1959). Section 249 forbids allowance to pzrzona who, while acting
in a fiduciary or repraentative capacity in reorganization proceedings, had purcha-.d or
sold stock of the debtor. See also In re Midland Unitcd Co., 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947);
In re Inland Gas Corp., 73 F. Supp. 7M5 (E.D. Xcy. 1947).
34. 52 Stat. 901 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1953).
35. See note 24 supra. See also Cook & Feldman, Insidcr Trading Undcr The Sccu-
rities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 335, 3S3 (1953), where it is stated that pzrmion
to file a brief had been granted in every instance up to that time-19.93.
36. See note 24 supra.
1. 1 U.S.C. § 2312 (195S) (Dyer Act).
2. Model Penal Code § 401 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); see 2910 F.2d at 774.
3. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).
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know what he is doing, no more than . . . a wild beast."'4 The element of
bestiality was eliminated in time and "right and wrong" substituted for "good
and evil," but it was not until the M'Naghten case5 in 1843 that much of the
uncertainty inherent in such determinations was eliminated. When M'Naghten
was found "not guilty, on the ground of insanity,"' the judges of England,
before an inquiry by the House of Lords, rendered what was to become one
of the most important advisory opinions of common law history.7 They defined
as insanity proof that "at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." s This so-called
"right and wrong" test has become the sole test of criminal responsibility in
England and in the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions9 and has
been approved by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States.10
It has been greatly criticised over the years," but still prevails in its original
4. Id. at 764.
5. 10 Ci. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). Daniel M'Naghten, a Scotsman, shot
Edward Drummond, the principal secretary to Prime Minister Robert Peel, mistaking him
for Peel. It was clear that M'Naghten was insane, being subject to hallucinations and
delusions of persecution. The medical evidence showed that his delusions had left him
with no perception of right and wrong and that he was unable to control any act connected
with his delusions.
6. See Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 59 (1954).
7. See Biggs, The Guilty Mind 101-07 (1955).
8. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). In the instant case Chief
Judge Biggs indicates that the substance of the M'Naghten test was published nearly 257
years earlier in an ancient book, the Eirenarcha, by William Lambard of Lincolns Inn.
290 F.2d at 764.
9. See Model Penal Code § 4.01, app. A (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). In New York, fot
example, the M'Naghten rules were adopted in People v. Klein, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13 (N.Y
1845). The legislature codified them in N.Y. Sess. Laws 1881, ch. 676, amended by N.Y
Sess. Laws 1882, ch. 384 §§ 20, 21, as amended, N.Y. Penal Law § 1120. The New York
courts have applied them without modification. But see the criticism by Cardozo, J. in People
v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 338-39, 110 N.E. 945, 946 (1915). See also People v. Horton, 308
N.Y. 1, 16-23, 123 N.E.2d 609, 616-21 (1954) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
10. 160 U.S. 469, 478 (1895). The rule was reapproved in a dictum in the second Davis
case, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897), and in Matheson v. United States, 277 U.S. 540, 543 (1913).
See 290 F.2d at 767-69, arguing that the Supreme Court has not held the M'Naghten test
the only one which may be applied in the federal courts.
11. Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Durham v. United States
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 549 (3d Cir. 1951)
(Biggs, J., dissenting), aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953). For criticism from the legal profession
see Laub, Insanity as a Defense to Homicide in Pennsylvania, 20 Temp. L.Q. 345 (1947);
Polsky, Present Insanity-From the Common Law to the Mental Health Act and Back,
2 Viii. L. Rev. 504 (1957); Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 367 (1955). See also medical criticism in Hall & Meninger, Psychiatry and the
Law, 38 Iowa L. Rev. 687 (1953); Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness--Two Faces of
the Same Coin, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 320 (1955).
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form in most of the states, although fourteen, 12 retaining MWaghtcn as the
basic test, have supplemented it with the "irresistible impulse doctrine."u3
Until 1954 only the Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire had completely
rejected M'Naghten. That court, in State v. Pike,"1 had held that there could
be no clearly defined test of mental disease as a matter of law, but that all
symptoms and tests of mental disease were purely matters of fact to be deter-
mined by the jury.15 In 1954 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, in Durham v. United States,1' admittedly followed New
Hampshire in repudiating both the M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse doc-
trines and held that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was a product of a mental disease or mental defect."' 7 Although heralded
as bringing the rule of law closer to the newly discovered facts of medical
science, this test never received judicial support.' Prior to the instant case it
stood rejected by the United States Court of Military Appeals,'a three federal
courts of appeals,2 0 and thirteen states.
2
'
12. See Model Penal Code § 4.01 app. A (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 711-12, 150 N.E2d 914, 9)9
(195S), where the rule is stated: "[A] person may be able to dicriminate betwecn right
and wrong yet his mind may be in such a diseased condition that his reason, cowucience
and judgment are overwhelmed by the disease to such an extent that he 'acted from an
irresistible and uncontrollable impulse.' In such a case 'the act [is] not the act of a voluntary
agent' and the person committing it is not criminally recponible." This rule is applied
along with MI'Naghten in the following jurisdictions; Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michian, ontana, and Wyoming.
See also Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 54S, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
14. 49 N.H. 399 (1869). See also State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1371).
15. 49 N.H. at 399.
16. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). This decision caused a great tide of discuwion
and criticism of tests for legal insanity. See Kalven, Insanity and the Criminal La w-A
Critique of Durham v. United States, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1955); 54 Colum. L. Rev.
1153 (1954); Note, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 273 (1955). See also note 13 supra. It Ls interesting
to note that the substance of the Durham rule was announced prior to M'Naghten in
Hadfield's Case, 27 St. Tr. 1231 (1300). Convinced that he was the .aviour of man ind,
Hadfield tried to assassinate George I so that his resultant c-.xcution would bkcome a
sacrifice as had that of Jesus Christ. His attempt vas unsuccesful and he woundcd an
equerry instead.
17. 214 F2d at 874-75.
13. See, e.g., Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940
(1957). '"Modern psychiatry to the contrary, the criminal law is grounded upon the theory
that, in the absence of special conditions, individuals are free to exercise a choice Etweuen
possible courses of conduct and hence are morally responsible. Thus, it is moral guilt that
the law stresses." Id. at 643. See Haheem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime
and Correction, 23 Law ' Contemp. Prob. 650 (195S).
19. United States v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 17 C.MA.R. 346 (19F4), rcv'd on other
grounds sub nom. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
20. Voss v. United States, 259 F.2d 699 (Sth Cir. 1958); Andcien v. United State:, 237
F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956).
21. People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 33S P.2d 416 (1959); People v. Carpentcr, 11 Ill. Zd
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The Model Penal Code, which previously had been adopted by only Ver-
mont,22 and from which the instant case drew heavily, provided that:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require.
ments of law.
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.23
In the instant case Judge Biggs rejected the phrase "appreciate the criminality
of his conduct" 24 saying first, that emphasis of the cognitive element would
distract the jury from the crucial issues, and secondly, that the cognitive ele-
ment would rarely be significant. 25 The test propounded in the instant case
lies between the strict MNaghten test and the liberal "product" rule of
Durham. The former had limited psychiatric testimony to a few specific ques-
tions; the latter had permitted an outright conclusion by the medical expert
concerning the production of the defendant's behavior by his mental condition.
The present case would permit a wide range of testimony to depict the de-
fendant's mental condition, allowing the jury, in the last analysis, to determine
the ultimate question of criminal responsibility.
The significance of this test is apparent when the shortcomings of both
M'Naghten and Durham are realized. M'Naghten did not treat the human
mind as an integrated whole composed of volitional and cognitive elements, but
restricted an accurate determination of criminal responsibility by limitation
of its probe to the element of knowledge, thus compelling the psychiatrist to
answer categorically, in terms not meaningful to his profession, whether de-
fendant knew the difference between right and wrong.2" The jury was not
provided with evidence from which to conclude as to defendant's sanity. On
the other hand, because it failed to indicate any standard to the jury, Durham
60, 142 N.E.2d 11 (1957); Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185 (1956); Bryant
v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955); Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150
N.E.2d 914 (1958) ; State v. Kitchens, 129 Mont. 331, 286 P.2d 1079 (1955); State v. Goza,
317 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958); Sollars v. State, 73 Nev. 248, 316 P.2d 917 (1957);
State v. Wolak, 26 N.J. 464, 140 A.2d 385 (1958); State v. Andrews, 86 R.I. 341, 134 A.2d
425, cert denied, 355 U.S. 898 (1957); State v. Goyet, 120 Vt. 12, 132 A.2d 623 (1957);
State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957) ; Kwosek v. State, 8 Wis. 2d 640, 100
N.W.2d 339 (1960).
22. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4801 (1959). The Model Code has been under legislative
study in several states, including New York and Massachusetts. See New York Governor's
Conference on the Defense of Insanity (1958); Judicial Council of Massachusetts, H, 2086,
56 (1957).
23. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
24. 290 F.2d at 774 n.32.
25. Ibid.
26. "A very large part of the confusion which almost invariably results in the trial of
the criminal defendant alleged to be insane, lies in the fact that the law insists that the
psychiatrist deal with mental states and conditions which do not exist save as legal con-
ceptions." United States v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 567 (3d Cir. 1951) (Biggs, CJ., dissenting).
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placed solely on the psychiatrist the burden of determining the existence of a
mental disorder and its effect upon defendant. To the psychiatrist alone was
gven the power to determine the defendant's mental state, thus relegating the
jury's task to a determination of whether his conclusion should be accepted. Its
"product" concept was so logically ambiguous as to have been criticised as
fatally defective as an administrative standard.27 Furthermore, Durham elimi-
nated the ethical concept2 8 which for centuries had been the very basis of
criminal responsibility. In this respect it was ertreme, although many modem
psychiatrists felt the rule medically sound.2 9 The rule of the principal case goes
beyond M'ATaghten by recognizing both volition and cognition. The defendant
must not only know what he is doing but must also be able to control his
faculties. Where M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse doctrine had required
total impairment of volition, the present case would require merely "sub-
stantial" impairment. Thus the psychiatrist would be permitted to present
evidence as to any and all possible causes of the criminal act and to show
their independence. Furthermore, the "substantial impairment" rule provides
a better standard whereby the jury can "translate that mental condition into
an answer to the ultimate question of whether the defendant possessed the
necessary guilty mind to commit the crime charged."''  Without question the
subject case makes a deep inquiry into accused's condition with the result that
many more factors are considered in reaching a final determination as to his
criminal responsibility.
The Supreme Court of the United States has impliedly encouraged the de-
velopment of a better rule of criminal responsibility.' The result of the
27. The leading critic of the Durham test, Prof. Herbert WVcchler, Chief Reporter for
the Model Penal Code, has argued:
(1) If it means that a defendant is not criminally recponsible if he would not have com-
mitted the act alleged "but for" the illness it could be construed to cover every eace where
mental illness is present.
(2) If it means "product" in the sense of the illncs completely excluding volition by
the defendant, then Durham represents no advance over the right-and-w-rong rule of
M'Naghten. Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367, 370-
73 (1955). See also Model Penal Code § 4.01, comment at 159 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). In
Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 603, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the court of appeals reaponded
to this criticism by ex:plaining that there must be proof that the illnezs "critically" or "1de-
cisively" affected the defendants behavior. This wording appcars to lean towards the "'u.b-
stantial impairment" test of the instant case.
28. Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the MN'aghten rules, 42 AMB.AJ. 917,
91S (1956). The traditional concepts of free will and individual responsibility have alvays
been the basis of criminal law; overemphasizing the influence of the emotions or the
unconscious is regarded as tending toward determinism and subordinating the role of the
intellect.
29. See, e.g., Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 373 (1952).
30. 290 F.2d at 773.
31. See the reasoning of the instant court. 290 F.2d at 769-70. In the concurring opinion
of Kwo2e21 v. State, S Wis. 2d 640, 656, 100 N.W2d 339, 346 (1910), three Judges advocated
a change from the M'Naghten rule to that of the Model Penal Code. See also FI her v.
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measured study of a problem, complex, but of vital and practical importance,
the decision here is realistic; the question of criminal responsibility is a jury
determination; the adequate presentation of facts thus is essential. The danger
of confusion due to a welter of unintelligible terminology, eschewed by the
instant court,32 is scarcely reason to retain M'Naghten; it is rather an excuse.
However, the present case may be found objectionable by many courts on the
reasoning of the New York Governor's Commission on the Defense of In-
sanity,33 that the M'Naghten rules ought to be retained until a stricter view
of mental disease is applied.3 4 The commission found essential a clarification
of that diagnosis of psychopathy which would be insufficient to exempt a defen-
dant from criminal responsibility. 35 There remains the valid fear that relin-
quishment of tried norms of criminal responsibility might create a laxity of
enforcement which would undermine the entire administration of criminal
law.36
Insurance-Excess Liability of Insurer for Bad Faith Refusal to Settle.
-Defendant Standard Accident and Insurance Company, under the terms of
its $10,000 liability policy, assumed the defense of an action brought against
its insured for damages resulting from his negligence. Travellers' Insurance
Company, which had issued a $5,000 liability policy to the insured's joint tort-
feasor joined in the defense.' In the face of evidence not only that claimant
United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476 (1946). But see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952).
Mr. justice Frankfurter has declared that he fails to see "why the rules of law should be
arrested at the state of phychological knowledge of the time when they were formu-
lated. . . ." Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Reprt, Cmd. No. 8932,
at 102 (1953). Mr. Justice Douglas asserted that "the only warrant for the M'Naghten rule
of insanity was tradition." Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers
and Psychiatrists, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 485, 494-95 (1956).
32. 290 F.2d at 772.
33. New York Governors' Conference on the Defense of Insanity (1958).
34. Id. at 9.
35. Id. at 10. However, the instant case, in considering whether a psychopath may be
insane, was careful to disapprove of the definition of a psychopath as one "who Is a
habitual criminal but whose mind is functioning normally." 290 F.2d at 761.
36. Further cause for hesitation among courts and legislatures has been the uncertainty
as to the disposition of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity. See 290 F.2d at
775-76. See also Order of Issuance of New Mandate, 285 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1960); Pollard
v. United States, 282 F.2d 450, 464 (6th Cir. 1960); Howard v. United States, 229 F.2d
602, 608 (5th Cir. 1956) (Rives, J., dissenting). Confinement to a psychiatric institution
does not necessarily result in rehabilitation and cure. In the past it has not been uncommon
to note repeated criminal behavior by individuals after supposed cure and release from
psychiatric care.
1. Insured collided with a taxicab, causing it to mount the sidewalk where it ran down
claimant, who sued the drivers and owners of both vehicles.
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would succeed on trial and that the resultant judgment might exceed policy
coverage, but also that Travellers was willing to contribute the full amount of
its coverage to a settlement, Standard met claimant's repeated compromise
offers with the arbitrary formula of contribution of a sum no greater than the
contribution of Travellers. A judgment of $105,00 resulted. - The insured's
trustee in bankruptcy instituted the instant action against Standard for that
amount of the judgment in excess of policy coverageI, alleging that Standard
had failed to exercise good faith in its consideration of claimant's overtures
of settlement. On trial in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the evidence of defendant's bad faith was held sufficient to impose
liability. Harris v. Standard Acc. & Ins. Co., 191 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Under the ordinary liability policy the insurer has the right to control the
defense of actions against the insured and the option, but not the duty, to
settle rather than risk a judgment in excess of policy coverage. Generally, the
insured may not settle without the consent of the insurer.4 The company,
however, may be held liable for either a negligentV or bad faith0 failure to
settle. The courts hold, where liability is found, that there is a duty to settle
either as an implied term of the contract of insurance,- or as arising from the
2. 191 F. Supp. 538, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
3. Travelers' paid $5,CO0, Standard $10,CCO and the cab owner, who recivcd a re-
lease, $1,00. An excess of $S9,000 remained.
4. See, e.g., Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 At. 303-04
(1899); St. Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employcr' Indcm. Corp., 224 Mo. App.
221, 223, 23 S.VW.2d 215, 216 (1930); *McDonald v. Royal Indcm. Ins. Co., 169 X.L.
30S, 310, 162 Ad. 620 (1932); Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 MY.. 247, 2i0, 140
M.E. 577, 573 (1923). As to the usual terms see Kecton, Liability Irrurance and Re-
sponsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1137 n.1 (1954); Note, 2 Sracu
L. Rev. 112 n.1 (1950). The company is bound to defend but may scttle or pay imurcd
the amount of the policy coverage. See, e.g., Brassil v. Tariland Cac. Co., 210 N ,Y 235,
104 NZ.E. 622 (1914); Annot., 126 A.L.R. S93 (1940). See also Radcliffe v. Franhln Nat'l
Ins. Co., 203 Ore. 1, 293 P.2d 1C02 (1956).
5. See, e.g, Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 31 N. 371, 127 At. 703
(1924); Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 79 N.H. 1 §. 105 At!.
604 (1919). The company's duty of care has been hdd to be that of the r =eonable man,
Dumas v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 4S4, 56 A.2d 57, C9 (1947), and not that
of the reasonable insurer, American Indem. Co. v. G. A. Stow ers Furniture Co., 39 SW 2d
956-57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
6. See, e.g, 'Nshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 63 F.2d F03 (6th Cir. 1934) (rcjccting
negligence); Byrnes v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 173 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (rejccting
negligence); aurach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 339 Macs. 14, I3 XE 2d 333
(1959) (rejecting negligence); Radio Taxi Serv. Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins, Co, 31 N.J.
299, 157 A.2d 319 (1960).
7. See Hiller v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930) (company's
duty is by reasonable implication from the terms of the contract.) See aLo Brae:il v.
laryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 241, 104 1.E. 622, 624 (1914) ("there is a con-
tractual obligation of universal force which underlies all written agrcmentU.") But sce
Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 6, at 209-10 (no liability in ncgli cnce or
contract); Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 10 N-E. 911
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agency relationship allegedly created by the contract 8 or the conflict of interests
inherent in the situation. 9 Although no court has imposed upon insurer an
absolute duty to accept an offer of compromise, 10 decisions have varied from
those unfavorable to insurers, easily finding liability,1 to those strongly un-
favorable to policyholders.' 2 Neither the duty itself13 nor the evidence necessary
to show a violation of the standard 14 has been too clearly defined. While some
states have recognized both the bad faith and negligence tests,1' other states
have confused the elements of the one with those of the other.10 Courts apply-
(1928). Cf. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1933).
S. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 627 (10th Cir. 1942);
Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 AtI. 708 (1924). But see
Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081 (1916), over-
ruled by Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952). The insurance
company controls the case. Settlement within policy limits averts the possibility of
judgment in excess of policy coverage, for which excess insured will be liable. The Insurer,
however, is liable for about the same amount in either case and thus has little to risk In
trying the action. See Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1138 (1954).
10. See Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Ind. App. 301, 115 N.E. 348 (1917);
C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 At. 653 (1914).
11. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 277 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1960); American
Fid. & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1949) (insurer is in fiduciary
relationship); Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168 (1959).
12. City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643, 645 (1929)
(insurer need only make an "honest" judgment); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 108
Vt. 269, 187 AtI. 788, 796 (1936) (equating bad faith with actual fraud); Wisconsin Zinc
Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081 (1916) (insurer may not act
recklessly and contumaciously). But see Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481,
1 A.2d 817 (1938).
13. See Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1136, 1142 (1954).
14. The likelihood of success must be slim and a judgment in excess of policy coverage
probable. Springer v. Citizens Cas. Co., 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957) (insurer tried to
force insured to contribute to settlement); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Constr.
Co., 69 F.2d 462 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 569 (1934) (additional evidence of
admissions by insurer that settlement was the better course considered necessary to
establish insurer's liability); Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97
N.W.2d 168 (1959) (failure to follow advice of counsel); Garcia & Diaz, Inc. v, Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 147 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (rejection of offer after verdict); Rad-
cliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 Ore. 1, 298 P.2d 1002 (1956) (failure to inform
insured of settlement offer).
15. See, e.g., Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947);
Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 AtI. 708 (1924); G. A.
Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
The distinction between the two is in actuality rather nebulous. See Keeton, Liability
Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1140-42 (1954).
16. E.g., Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930) found a
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ing the negligence test have imposed upon the insurer the duty to exercise
reasonable or due care in the consideration of settlement offers.17 Those follow-
ing the bad faith rule have not demanded so stringent a regard for the interests
of insured, some even requiring insured to show actual fraud by the insurer.'3
In the majority of "bad faith" jurisdictions, however, proof of actual fraud has
not been required, but the standard of bad faith has varied. 19 The insurer
has been held in good faith, even though it had adversely affected the interests
of the insured, as long as its actions did further its own interests.20 Thus the
insurer might not act arbitrarily to the exclusion of the interests of insured
but its duty to settle has been held little more than that imposed by the
contract. Other courts have found bad faith where the insurance company had
handled settlement negotiations differently than it would have were it to have
been completely liable for any judgment in the case.2 '
The present action, tried without a jury in federal district court, was con-
trolled by New York substantive law.2-2 While the New York Court of Appeals
has not spoken on the subject in some thirty years, it has refused to hold an
insurer liable for a negligent refusal to settle,' 3 and, although New York cases
duty of good faith but quoted with approval cases following the negligence rule and held
that insurer's duty was that of the reasonably prudent man. Negligence has bma held
evidence of bad faith. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Grtyhound Curp., 253 F-d 76 (5th
Cir. 1958).
17. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American IndLm. Co., 15 SIW.2d 544 (TM.
Comm'n App. 1929), found insurer to be the agent of insured and hence hld "to that
degree of care and diligence which an ordinarily prudent percon would uxcrce in the
management of his own business.. . ." Id. at 547. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Robb, 267
F.2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 1959). In Dumas v. Hartford Ace, & Indcm, Co., 94 NIL 4S4,
56 A.2d 57 (1947), the court indicated that insurer must Etand ready rcanably to
expend monies to purcbase immunity from judgment for inmurcd. Sze Wiln v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 145 Me. 370, 76 A.2d 111 (1950); American Indcm. Co. v. G. A. Stowcrm
Furniture Co., 39 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
13. See Bartlett v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 147, 167 At. 1K0, 1013 (19331; St.
Joseph Tranfer & Storage Co. v. Employers' Indem. Corp., 224 Mo. App. 221, 23 SW.,d
215 (1930); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Vt. 29, 17 At. 7"3 (193b).
19. See 62 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 105-06 (1943). See aho Kceton, Liability IT:urance
and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1139-40 n,6 (1959).
20. American Sur. Co. v. J. F. Schneider & Son, 307 S W.2d 192 W4 57). See
Auerbach v. 'Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 t1923); Cuuntr man v.
Breen, 241 App. Div. 392, 271 N.Y. Supp. 744 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd mem, 263 N.Y.
643, 198 N.E. 536 (1935).
21. See American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. L. C. Jones Truching Co., 321 P-2d 635 tO'da.
Sup. Ct. 1957); Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 3S9 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957). See
also Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1I0).
22. See, e.g., Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co., 196 F.2d t6, 10Z) (7th Cir. 1952), where the
court applied Illinois law "irrespective of which of the conflicting views we might think:
preferable."
23. Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 455-56, 19 N.E.
911, 912-13 (192S).
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have found an "obligation of good faith in carrying out ' 24 the insurance con-
tract, the tendency of New York decisions has been to adhere strictly to the
written contract, with liability in tort only grudgingly granted. 25 No New York
court has found evidence of bad faith sufficient to impose liability upon an
insurer for its failure to settle an action within policy limits, but the court of
appeals, in a broad dictum in Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp.,0
stated it was the well settled rule that an insurer would be liable for a bad
faith or fraudulent refusal to settle.27 In addition the Supreme Court, New
York County, in Brunswick Realty Co. v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 28 has held valid
a complaint alleging facts indicative of a bad faith refusal to settle by insurer, 9
adopting the reasoning of Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Dep. Co.,30 that an
insurer acted in bad faith where it had "abuse[d] the power vested in it and
recklessly and contumaciously refuse[d] to settle if it was apparent that in
all reasonable probability its conduct would not only result in damage to the
plaintiff but also in loss to itself." 31 Thus, while New York has recognized a
duty to settle, it has carefully limited its scope.
A duty to settle has been most readily found where a verdict greatly in excess
of policy coverage is highly probable, and insured's liability obvious.32 Not
only were these factors present in the instant case but there was also evidence
that, during the trial of the negligence action, Standard's counsel had admitted
that he "couldn't" win the case.3 3 Further, at no time was the insured informed
of the fact that a settlement offer had been made.3 4 The court found defendant's
attitude intransigent and arbitrary, 35 stating that its position "cannot con-
24. Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 241, 104 N.E. 622, 624 (1914). This
duty was said to be contractual. Ibid.
25. The New York Court of Appeals has never held an insurer to be under a good
faith duty to settle. Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 24, at 241-42, 104 N.E. at
624, imposed a general duty of good faith and the court has indicated in dicta that
there is a duty to act in good faith when considering a settlement offer. Best Bldg. Co.
v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928); Streat Coal Co. v.
Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., 237 N.Y. 60, 142 N.E. 352 (1923); Schencke Piano Co. v.
Philadelphia Cas. Co., 216 N.Y. 662, 110 N.E. 1049 (1915) (per curiam). But see Auer-
bach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923); McAlcenan v. Massachu-
setts Bonding & Ins. Co., 219 N.Y. 563, 114 N.E. 114 (1916) (per curiam).
26. 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928).
27. Id. at 453, 160 N.E. at 912.
28. 99 Misc. 639, 166 N.Y. Supp. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
29. Id. at 642-43, 166 N.Y. Supp. at 38-39. Claimant, who had suffered permanently
laming injuries, had offered to settle for the amount of policy coverage. Insurer allegedly
had neither defense nor witnesses and knew that judgment in excess of policy coverage
would be in claimant's favor.
30. 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081 (1916).
31. Id. at 51, 155 N.W. at 1087.
32. See 191 F. Supp. 538, 540.
33. Id. at 541 n.4. (Emphasis added.)
34. Id. at 543.
35. Id. at 542.
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ceivably be reconciled with a good-faith consideration of the interests of the
insured."' 6 On such facts Standard's bad faith was patent even under the
standard of the duty owing from the insurer to its insured in New York, and
certainly under a standard of reasonable care.37 Nevertheless, the instant court
applied the standard,3' broader than any New York had exacted, of Bl v.
Commercial Ins. Co., requiring the insurer to "accord the interest of its
insured the same faithful consideration it gives its own interest" and indicating
that "the fairest method of balancing the interests is for the insurer to treat
the claim as if it were alone liable for the entire amount.""'
The application of the Bell reasoning is indicative of the trend to e:pand the
insurer's duty to settle. MIany courts have rejected the negligence test and its
standard of reasonable care while at the same time the bad faith rule has
found greater acceptance".4  The duty exacted under the latter theory is almost
co-extensive with that formerly demanded by the negligence theory-tantamount
to a standard of reasonable care. We are now apparently at the point of
recognizing that "reasonable care" is the ultimate test of liability-whether we
cast the insurer's duty in terms of negligence or in terms of an agency or
fiduciary relationship.4-
36. Ibid.
37. See Chancey v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 336 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. PICO),
where the court went so far as to imply a duty to negotiate from a duty to ex.ercie
reasonable care.
38. 191 F. Supp. at 543, 544.
39. 230 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1960). In this diversity action, applying the law of Pcnsyl-
vania, a directed verdict in favor of insurer was reversed, the court finding the evidence
of defendant's bad faith suffident to warrant submi~sion of the question to a jury. Oa
a $10,C00 liability policy, insurer had refuned to accept a tflement offer of 825,c).
Only the extent of insured's liability was in question. The court indicated that inzurcr
should have further explored the possibility of settlement. Id. at 516.
40. Id. at 515.
41. See Hall v. Preferred Ace. Ins. Co., 204 F.2d 044 (5th Cir. 19.3); NXoby v.
American Auto. Ins. Co., 6S F.2d Z0S (6th Cir. 1934); Christian v. Preferred Ace. In, Co,
39 F. Supp. SSS (N.D. Cal. 1950); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 477, 46 So\W.2d 777
(1932); Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 339 'Mass. 104, 153 N-E2d 333
(1959); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 223 NAV. 613 (19:9);
Georgia Cas. Co. v. Cotton Mills Prods. Co., 159 Mis. 396, 132 So. 73 (1931); Zurmalt
v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 'Mo. 362, 223 S.W.2d 730 (1950); Wynnewood Lumber Co. v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 269, 91 S.E. 946 (1917); Radio Taxi Scrv., Inc. v. Lincoln
Mut. Ins. Co., 31 NJ. 299, 157 A.2d 319 (1960); Best Bldg. Co. v. Employer,' Liab,
Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928); Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co, 152
Ohio St. 15, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Vt 269,
187 Ad. 7M3 (1936); Berk v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 597, 15 NAVY2d 034
(1944).
42. There is actually no need to choose between one rule and the other. For [.armple,
Alabama has held that "there may be liability under both rulc... !' Watcra v. American
Cas. Co., 261 Ala. 252, 73 So. 2d 524, 523 (1953). Arkanas has rccc.ntly rcfuzzd to
"align ... [itself] exclusively with either . . ." the rule of negligence or that of bad faith.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 341 SA,.2d 36, 40 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 19L9).
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Labor Law-Hiring-Hall Referral System Not Illegal "Per Se"l-Coerclon
Must Be Proven for Reimbursement.-An association of motor truck opera-
tors entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Brotherhood of
Teamsters and several of the latter's local unions which, in effect, required the
operators to employ "casual" employees on a seniority basis through a hiring-
hall operated by one of the unions, "irrespective of whether such employee is or
is not a member of the Union."' A union member, who had obtained casual
employment with an employer who was a party to the agreement, was dis-
charged by the employer on complaint of the union that he had not been
referred through the hiring-hall. Subsequently charges were filed with the
National Labor Relations Board by the employee against the union and em-
ployer. The Board held 2 that the exclusive hiring-hall system was per se
illegal and that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act.3 The union was found to have committed
unfair labor practices under sections 8(b) (1) (a) and 8(b) (2)4 and was ordered,
jointly and severally with the employer, to reimburse all "casual employees" for
dues paid by them to the union. The court of appeals, one judge dissenting,
affirmed the ruling of a per se violation but reversed the reimbursement order.0
The United States Supreme Court, with two justices concurring and two justices
dissenting, 6 held that the hiring-hall system was not illegal per se and that the
refund order, absent specific evidence of coercion of union membership, was
beyond the Board's power. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667 (1961).
1. 365 U.S. 667, 668 (1961). The trial examiner distinguished the "casual" from
regular employee on the following bases: written application for employment; physical
examination; compliance with bonding requirements; irregular work shifts and pay for
holidays. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1629, 1639 (1958).
2. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., supra note 1.
3. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
4. Section 8b(1) (a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides in part: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or
coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That
this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. . . ." Section 8(b) (2)
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
"to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee In viola.
tion of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other
than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as
a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. .. ."
5. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per
curiam). The Board's reimbursement order includes all monies paid to the union cominenc-
ing six months prior to the filing of the unfair labor charges with the Board by the dis-
charged employee. In reversing the order of the Board, the circuit court upheld that
part of the reimbursement order concerning the complainant employee.
6. Mr. Justice Clark in his dissenting opinion concurred with the majority regarding
the general reimbursement remedy. 365 U.S. at 685 n.l.
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Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act made it an unfair
labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization . . ." Under this section refusal
to hire on the ground that the applicant lacks union membership has been
held an unlawful act of discrimination." A hiring system, however, utilizing
the union on a nonexclusive basis' or reserving to the employer the right to
discharge for nondiscriminatory reasons has been held proper.' Nor have all
forms of discrimination by an employer been forbidden. The statute condemned
only those discriminatory practices tending "to encourage or discourage" union
membership."'
The divergence of views between the Board and the courts regarding the
legality of the hiring-hall system was earlier reflected in XYLRB v. Swincrton,12
where the court refused to follow the Board's finding that a union clearance
arrangement, absent a guarantee of nondiscrimination, was illegal. The Szhzcr-
ton decision, however, relied on a dictum in Hun!kin-C nhey Coimtr. Co.13 to
the effect that there could not be an unfair labor practice under section
8(a) (3), if there had been a bargaining agreement whereby workers were to
be secured through a union, without specific evidence of unlawful discrinna-
tion. In Mozztain Pacific Chapter of Associated Gcn. Contractors Union,14 how-
ever, the NLRB ruled that an exclusive union referral system was per se illegal.
The Board there said that a referral-hiring system would be nondiscriminatory
only if the following standards were incorporated e.pressly in the contract:
(1) Selection of applicants for referral to jobs shall be on a nondiscriminatory basis.
* . . (2) The employer retains the right to reject any job applicant referred by the
union. (3) The parties to the agreement post in places Y:'here notices . . . are
customarily posted, all provisions relating to the functioning of the hiring arrange-
ment .... 1.5
The courts have not been in agreement with regard to acceptance of this
doctrine of per se illegality of an exclusive hiring-hall system. 0 In the instant
case the court refused to apply the Mountain Pacific doctrine. The majority's
reason for denying application of the doctrine was the inclusion in the contract
of a protective clause which specifically provided that referral would be based
7. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.&C. § 153
(1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
S. CCH Lab. L. Rep. , 4020.12, 4020.123 (2 Lab. Rel.) (1961).
9. Id. at ff 4020.14.
10. Id. at T 4060.
11. Id. at 4065; see, e.g., NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 4CG (5th Cir. 1956).
12. 202 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1953).
13. 95 N.L.R.B. 433 (1951).
14. 119 N.L.R.B. S (1957), remanded, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
15. 119 NJ.._R.B. at S96-97.
16. E.g., NLRB v. Int'l Hod Carriers' Union, 2S7 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1961); NLRB v.
E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960); Blorrison-Knudsen, Co. v. XLRB, 275
F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1960).
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on seniority with a minimum of three month's service and that there would
be no discrimination on the basis of union membership. Application of the
doctrine, said the Court, would necessitate the assumption that "a union
conducts its operations in violation of law or that the parties to this contract
did not intend to adhere to its express language."' 7 Thus the presence of the
protective clause prevented any such assumption of illegality until specific
evidence of illegal operation was offered. Although there was no protective
clause' 8 in Mountain Pacific, was there any real distinction between the two
contracts? In both cases the union was in the exclusive position of determin-
ing the referrals. In reasoning that the "discrimination" prohibited by the act
must be based on union membership, 19 the majority misinterpreted the Moun-
tain Pacific doctrine. There it was the act of transferring to the union what
was ultimately the exclusive power to hire or fire which constituted the
"discrimination" under section 8(a)(3); "here all that appears is unilateral
union determination and subservient employer action with no aboveboard ex-
planation .... "2o Thus there was no need to assume "illegal operation"
(i.e., specific acts of discrimination by the union) under the contract, since
the referral system was found to be illegal per se. By establishing the union
as the "hiring lord" with the inevitable result of encouraging union control
over employment there was created a closed shop environment which is
prohibited under the National Labor Relations Act. 2' For
it is reasonable to infer that the Union will be guided in its concession by an eye
towards winning compliance with a membership obligation or union fealty in some
other respect. . . . From the final authority over hiring vested in the Respondent
Union ... the inference of encouragement of union membership is inescapable.22
Clearly, discrimination existed in the present contract where the employers
by entering into the hiring arrangement announced to prospective applicants
that they would not accept applicants who were not referred by the union.
The majority and concurring opinions agreed that the hiring system inevitably
encouraged applicants to believe their prospects of employment were dependent
on and would be enhanced by membership in or fealty to the union.2 3 Mr.
Justice Clark in his dissenting opinion aptly stated the effects of the system:
Does the ordinary applicant for casual employment, who walks into the union hall at
the direction of his prospective employer, consider his chances of getting dispatched
for work diminished because of his non-union status or his default in dues payment?2 4
17. 365 U.S. at 676.
18. The majority in the instant case stated there was a nondiscrimination clause. Id.
at 671. But an examination of the contract revealed none. See Mountain Pacific Chapter
of Associated Gen. Contractors Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 894, 902 (1957).
19. 365 U.S. at 675.
20. 119 N.L.R.B. at 896.
21. 2 Legislative Hist. of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 1010.
22. 119 N.L.R.B. at 896. (Emphasis added.)
23. 365 U.S. at 675, 679.
24. Id. at 691.
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The result is a restriction of the worker's right of freedom to engage in or to
refrain from union activities guaranteed under section 7 of the N.L.R.AYa
Therefore in order to insure that the present arrangement would not result in
the encouragement of union membership in violation of section S a)(3) it is
necessary, at the very least, that the applicants be apprised of their rights
under the contract and more espedaly-their rights to employment without
regard to union activities. Application of Mozntain Pacific's safeguard that the
parties "post in places where notices to employees and applicants for employ-
ment are customarily posted, all provisions relating to the functioning of the
hiring arrangement...,",G would adequately fulfill this requirement.
The majority in the instant case stated that "there being no express ban of
hiring-halls in any provisions of the Act, those who add one, whether it be
the Board or the courts, engage in a legislative act."27 This position lies at
the basis of the court's misinterpretation of the issue, for it was not the hiring-
hall but rather the ex.-clusive hiring-hall which was the subject of dispute.
Although, as the Court pointed out, Senator Taft viewed the hiring-hall as not
necessarily illegal, he did not believe that the exclusive referral system should
be protected under the N.L.R.A. Senator Taft stated, "But he [the emiployer]
cannot make a contract in advance that he will only take the men recommended
by the union."25 It is clear from Congress' express acceptance of, -9 and the
NlLRB's consistent adherence30 to the Mountain Pacific doctrine, that the
majority has disregarded congressional intent and engaged in a legislative
rather than a judicial act.31
25. 49 Stat. 452 (1953), amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 US.C.
§ 157 (195s).
26. 119 N.L.R.B. at S97.
27. 365 U.S. at 674.
28. S. Rep. No. 1S27, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 13-14 (1950).
29. 1 Legislative fist, of the Labor-Management Rcporting and Diclosdure Act of 1959.
The House Managers' report stated: "Nothing in such provLion [new am.ndramt] is
intended to restrict the applicability of the hiring hall provl:-ions nunciatcd in the
Mountain Pacific case... !" Id. at 946.
30. See, e.g., Local 176, United p3hd. of Carpenters, 122 X.L.R.B. 9'C (1959); Con-
solidated Western Steel Div., 122 N.L.R.B. 359 (1959); Hod Carricr. Union, 121 X.L.RB.
50 (1958); K-M. & 11. Constr. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1953).
31. In NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961), a companion case to the
instant one, the foremen who were union members did the hiring but thcr_1xws were
subject to removal by the employer. A "saving clause" provided that the general law3 of
the International Typographical Union not in conflict with the contract or with fedcral
or state law would govern conditions not specifically cnumcratcd in the contract. ThLC
general laws required union membership for certain pL-sitions. The court rukJ that the
contract was not unlawful on its face, due to the provision for hiring by foremen and
the "s ing clause." Although under the law foremen are considcred the employer'3 agents,
it cannot be denied that this system is the equivalent of the union hiring-hall. Under
Mountain Pacific, the absolute delegation of the selection of employecs to the foreman
who, while technically the employer's agent, nevertheless is a union member, contitutes
a discriminatory practice resulting in the encouragement of union mcmberzhip. The effect
of a "saving clause" has itself been controversial. A distinction betwccn a contract ille-al
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Prior to Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB32 there had been considerable
authority for the requirement that there be a showing of specific evidence that
the employer, when discriminating, intended to encourage or discourage union
membership. 33 In Radio Officers' where the complainant, as in the instant
case, obtained employment without union clearance and subsequently was re-
fused referral, 34 the Court rejected the specific evidence requirement. The
Court recognized that motivation of the employer to encourage or discourage
membership is essential to a section 8(a) (3) unfair practice but applied the
common-law rule that a man is deemed to intend the foreseeable consequences
of his acts, 35 and therefore, upon consideration of the facts the Board may infer
the requisite intent.36 The Court in the instant case misconstrued the issue
when it said: "But surely discrimination cannot be inferred from the face of
the instrument [the contract]. . .. ,,37 Discrimination was present in the
instant hiring system per se. It is not the discrimination in selecting applicants
for referral but rather the employer's motivation in encouraging union member-
ship which may be inferred by the Board.38
Related to the findings of unfair labor practices have been the remedies of
cease and desist as well as reimbursement orders authorized by section 10(c)80
of the N.L.R.A. With regard to reimbursements, Local 60, United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. NLRB40 held, upon an affirmative finding that there was no
evidence of coercion of membership or dues, that the Board was not authorized
to require reimbursement under section 10(c). Here two applicants were denied
employment because of a lack of referral from the union. This decision re-
stricted the Brown-Olds41 case, where the court after finding a closed shop
on its face and one which is valid on its face has led to contrary rulings. The former
cannot be validated by a "saving clause" whereas the latter may. A clause Illustrative of
one illegal on its face would be one expressly providing for a closed shop. Relying on
Mountain Pacific Chapter, the delegation in the News case would appear to be illegal per se.
32. 347 U.S. 17 (1954), affirming NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F.2d 719 (2d
Cir. 1952).
33. See 347 U.S. at 23 n.8 for collection of authorities.
34. NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1952), involving a similar factual
background, was one of several conflicting opinions in the lower courts reviewed by Radio
Officers' in an exhaustive treatment of section 8(a)(3).
35. 347 U.S. at 45. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion discussed the
variant positions. Id. at 55-56.
36. Id. at 44, 49.
37. 365 U.S. at 675.
38. 347 U.S. at 44, 48.
39. 49 Stat. 454 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1958).
40. 365 U.S. 651 (1961). The refund order was the only one challenged on appe, by
the union. Id. at 653.
41. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 115 N.L.R.B. 594 (1956). Brown-Olds based its
order on Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943), which in a divided
opinion, settled the dispute concerning reimbursement orders then raging in five circuits.
In this case there was a check-off system utilized to collect dues in a company-controlled
union. The company check-off was the factor which led to the inference of coercion.
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referral hiring system illegal, ordered the refunding of dues and assessments
paid by all employees retroactive to six months prior to the date of the amended
charge. The rationale was that the dues were coerced from the members as
the price for retaining their jobs. The Board reasoned that the refunding of
the dues would best effectuate the policies of the N.L,.R.A. as well as remove
the fruits of the unfair labor practice from the wrongdoer. Local 60, Unitcd
Bhd. of Carpenters reiterated the prerequisite for the issuance of a reimburse-
ment order-there must be evidence that the dues were coerced.
That coercion is necessary before a reimbursement order will be decreed
has been undisputed.1 The degree of evidence necessary to establish coercion
has been in issue. The circuit courts have required a showing of actual coercion,
yet inferences of coercion have been made where the hiring vas under a
check-off or closed shop system.43 Thus if the hiring system is illegal per se,
i.e., check-off or closed shop, coercion may be inferred 4 unless, as in the
Carpenters case, the court makes an affirmative determination of lack of evi-
dence of coercion.
Negligence-Damages Recoverable for Injuries Due to Fright 'Without
Impact.-A complaint before the court of claims alleged that the attendant
at a state operated skiing center had failed to secure and lock the safety belt
on a chair lift upon which plaintiff, a nine-year-old girl, was a passenger.
Plaintiff claimed that during the descent of the lift she became hysterical and
suffered severe emotional injury with "residual physical manifestations." A
motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a cause of action was de-
nied' but the appellate division reversed.2 The court of appeals, overruling
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,3 upheld the court of claims decision. Negligently
Id. at 545 (concurring opinion). The Brown-Olds decision held that the company domina-
tion of the union in the Virginia Electric case was unnecescary "in order for collcction of
dues to be unlawful under a closed-shop contract." United Asin of Journeymen, 115
N.L.R.B. 594, 601.
42. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 1943); Morrison-
Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1960); Morrison-Knuds-n Co, v. NLRB,
275 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1960); Building Materials Teamsters v. NLRB, 275 F.2d (09 (2d
Cir. 1960); Western Union Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1940).
43. For an excellent synopsis see NLRB v. United States Steel Corp, 278 F.2d &6G
901-03 (3d Cir. 1960).
44. Judge Jones, in Dixie Bedding Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1959),
presented this view: "We agree that there must be some showing of cocrcion . . . as a
prerequisite to the Board's issuance of a reimbursement order .... [Hlowever, the existcnce
of the ... proxision requiring the petitioner's employecs to become membr s of the union
... was in and of itself sufficient coercion . . . ." Id. at 07.
1. The court relied on Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E2d 249, 176 N.Y.S2d
996 (1953).
2. Battalla v. State, 11 App. Div. 2d 613, 200 N.Y.S.2d 052 (3rd Dcp't V19). The
decision was based on Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354
3. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1S96).
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caused injuries consisting of emotional disturbance and resultant physical
damage are recoverable without impact in New York. Battalla v. State,
10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
When injury results from the wrongful conduct of another and the tradi-
tionally necessary elements of a tort action exist-a foreseeable duty, its
breach, and proximate causation-an award of damages has generally been
allowed.4 The negligence rule in New York has held a wrongdoer liable in
damages for the proximate consequences of that conduct which he might
reasonably have foreseen would result in injury.5 New York, however, in
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,6 had held that there might be no recovery for
physical injuries sustained through fright occasioned by the negligence of
another in the absence of an immediate physical injury.1 In that case defend-
ant's horse car had careered through a street upon which plaintiff was waiting
to board another of defendant's cars. The team halted only inches from
plaintiff, allegedly causing her such fright that she subsequently suffered a
miscarriage. The court reasoned that this could not form the basis of an
action and thus no recovery could be had for any physical consequences of
defendant's acts and further that defendant's act could not be held to be
the proximate cause of the physical injury.9 Finally, the court reasoned: "If
the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it would
naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained
of may be easily feigned .... To establish such a doctrine would be contrary
to principles of public policy." 10 In the sixty-five years'1 since Mitchell,
the clear majority of American courts12 and England 13 have refused to apply its
4. See Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N.Y. 264, 282 (1884). See also Prosser, Torts § 35 (2d ed.
1955).
5. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
6. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
9. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355.
10. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354.
11. Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 Hun. 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888) had earlier dealt
with the impact problem. "We have been unable to find either principle or authority for
the maintenance of this action ... ." Id. at 356.
12. Of those states which have considered the question, twenty-four have allowed re-
covery, fourteen denied it. For an alignment of American jurisdictions see Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 100, 134, 143 (1959).
13. In 1888 the Privy Council, in Victorian Railways Comm'rs v. Coultas, [1888]
13 App. Cas. 222 (Vict.) denied liability without impact reasoning that there was no
precedent for the action and no proximity between the injury and the ordinary consequences
of fright. This doctrine was subsequently repudiated in Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2
K.B. 669, where the court allowed recovery for damages due to nervous shock and pre-
mature birth. In Coyle v. Watson [1915] A.C. 1, 13 (Scot. 1914) the court states, "the
case [Coultas] can no longer be treated as a decision of guiding authority."
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rule. Numerous legal scholars1 4 and the American Law Institute's have aligned
themselves in opposition to the Mitchell rule. While imposing liability for
physical injuries due to nervous shock alone, it seems well established that
there may be no recovery for fright without concomitant physical injury."0
A distinction has been drawn regarding those cases where there has been some
physical injury and it has been said that "because there were no physical
injuries, recovery for mental suffering was not authorized. 1 7
A minority of jurisdictions have followed the Mitchell rule and refused to
impose liability for physical injury without impact These jurisdictions,
however, have softened the strict effect of the rule by finding exceptions to it.19
In New York recovery has heretofore been granted, regardless of "impact,"
if defendant's acts were intentional or wanton'2 Recovery has also been
granted when defendant's conduct constituted a breach of contract,21 or when
14. No eaustive collection of authorities is attempted. See Bohlen, Right to Recover for
Injury Resulting From Negligence Without Impact, 50 U. Pa. L. Rev. 141 (1902); Campbell,
Injury Without Impact, 1951 Ins. LJ. 654; Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance a- Legal
Damage, 20 Alich. L. Rev. 497 (1922); Hallen, Damages for Phyfical Injuric Re..ulting
from Fright or Shock, 19 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1933); Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936); M .icce, Prychic Injury
and Tort Liability in New York, 24 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (1949); Smith, Relation of Emo-
tions to Injury and Disease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193 (1944); Throc:morton, Dama, c for
Fright, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 260 (1921); Wilson, The New York Rule as to Xervout Shoch,
11 Cornell L. Q. 512 (1926).
15. Restatement, Torts § 436 (1934), presents the facts of Mitchell v. Roche:ter Ry.,
and suggests a recovery in this situation.
16. See, e.g, Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d C43 (1952);
Kuhr Bros. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 35, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954); Brown v. Crawford,
296 Ky. 249, 177 S.X.2d 1 (1943).
17. Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234, 249 P2d Z43, 45 (1952).
18. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 163 Mlass. 205, 47 N.E. 03 (1,97); Ewing v.
Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 At. 340 (1392). See also Annot., 0 AMLR2d
134 (1959). The cases rely on the reasoning that the impact provides a guaranty aaruinzt
fabricated claims. "To allow recovery for fright, fear, nervous thoc:, humiliation, mental or
emotional distre--with all the disturbances and illnesses which accompany or rcult there-
from-where there has been no physical injury or impact, would open a Pandora'% bgx"
Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 16S-69, 142 A.2d 263, 266 (195S). See alo Ward v. Wct
New Jersey & S.R.R., 65 NJ.L. 383, 47 At. 561 (19C0) (the court reasoned in this in-tance
that the physical injury caused by the fright or shock was too remote).
19. Intentional or reckless acts causing mental distress is the major cxception rco,_,niz-d
by the minority jurisdictions. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilkins, 131 Ark. 137, 25 S,.V2d 423
(1930); Gadbury v. Bleltz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925), Annot., 44 AL R. 4:5
(1926).
20. Beck v. Libraro, 220 App. Div. 547, 221 N.Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dp't 1927) firing
of a loaded gun into the plaintiff's apartment); Prciser v. Wiclandt, 43 App. Div. 5, 62
N.Y. Supp. S90 (2d Dep't 1900) (landlord commenccd procecding5 to tear down hlou:
while tenant was ill and unable to move); see Restatement, Torts § 46 (Supp. 1943). The
courts have reasoned that if the conduct of the actor was villful or wanton he 'ihould La
held strictly accountable.
21. Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N.Y. IC6, 126 NE. C47 4l9201; Gillc~pie v.
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food contamination 22 was involved. Damages for physical injury to the plain-
tiff's person which were the natural and immediate result of defendant's negli-
gence have also been held recoverable regardless of whether "impact" had
occurred.23 If the fright had caused an immediate faint an award was held
proper. 24 Finally the New York courts had established an exception that all
but abrogated the rule. Upon a showing that some injury, battery, or impact
was coincident in point of time with the fright, recovery was allowed for re-
sultant physical injuries regardless of whether the impact had caused the injury
for which redress was sought.25 The most trivial form of impact was held a suf-
ficient basis for the imposition of liability for injuries due to concurrent fright
or shock.26 The instant court, in rejecting the Mitchell rule and its festoon of
exceptions, and aligning New York with the majority of jurisdictions, reasoned
that a negligent defendant must be held responsible for his acts regardless of
actual contact or its absence; a duty had been breached and a right violated,
thus the right to bring an action existed. The court rejected the theory that
Brooklyn Heights R.R., 178 N.Y. 347, 70 N.E. 857 (1904) (breach of duty by a common
carrier toward a passenger); cf. Kellogg v. Commodore Hotel, Inc., 187 Misc. 319, 64
N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (element of abuse or insult is necessary to the action; mere
failure to provide a room as promised is insufficient). The contract right provides tile
court with something external so the emotional disturbance may be added. Recovery has
not been extended to breaches of ordinary contracts. Frank v. Justine Caterers, Inc., 271
App. Div. 980, 68 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1947).
22. Carroll v. New York Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N.Y. Supp. 553 (2d
Dep't 1926) (recovery permitted for illness suffered as a result of the sight of contaminated
food); Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 125 Misc. 835, 211 N.Y. Supp. 582 (2d Dep't 1925).
The rule was adopted for public policy reasons to prevent the perpetration of fraud. Some
workmen's compensation cases also involve fright. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Bing-
hamton, 218 App. Div. 451, 218 N.Y. Supp. 355 (3d Dep't 1926) (heart attack caused by
fright-recovery allowed). Compensation rules do not require natural and probable con-
sequences but only actual injury traceable to an accident in the course of employment.
23. Mundy v. Levy Bros. Realty Co., 184 App. Div. 467, 170 N.Y. Supp. 994 (2d Dep't
1918) (the court could have found a slight impact but rather relied on immediate personal
injury). Because the injury is immediate there is little fear of fabrication and thus the
courts have a guaranty of the worthiness of the claim. Schachter v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co., 146 App. Div. 139, 130 N.Y. Supp. 549 (1st Dep't 1911) (defend/nt's negli-
gence caused a subsequent panic).
24. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914)
(plaintiff fainted from a shock).
25. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931). The court cited with ap-
proval Chief Justice Holmes' opinion in a landmark Massachusetts case, Homans v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902). "But when there has been a battery
and the nervous shock results from the same wrongful management as the battery, It Is
at least equally impracticable to go further and to inquire whether the shock comes through
the battery or along with it." 257 N.Y. at 238, 177 N.E. at 433.
26. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Dougherty, 286 App. Div. 1061, 144 N.Y.S.2d 746 (3rd Dep't
1955) (blast of air filled with glass and wooden splinters sufficient impact); Hack v. Dady,
142 App. Div. 510, 511, 127 N.Y. Supp. 22, 23 (2d Dep't 1911) (a few drops of melted lead
falling upon the plaintiff held sufficient contact).
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the fabrication of claims would result, as argued in lithce!, a and stated that
it is the dut, of the courts to ascertain the worthiness of a cause of action and
to compensate real injuries-8
The instant case left undecided whether recovery may be had in New York
where emotional disturbance alone results from negligently caused fright. Those
jurisdictions allowing recovery without impact have done so only where plain-
tiff has been able to prove some physical injury.2  Obviously the law has en-
deavored to be practical. "[T]he damages suffered where the only manifesta-
tion is fright are too subtle and speculative to be capable of admeasurement
by any standard known to law; but when the damages are physical and objec-
tive. . . the damages are quite as capable of being measured by a jury as if
they had ensued from an impact or blow."'2 ' It has also been argued that there is
no legal duty on the part of the defendant to refrain from negligent interference
with plaintiff's peace of mind. 3 Upon trial of the instant case, then, plaintiff
must show evidence of "residual physical manifestations," unless recovery in
New York now be possible for emotional disturbance caused by fright or shock
without concomitant physical disability. In recent years the court of appeals
has indicated a tendency to liberalize rules of liability, -2 expandint the pos-
sibility of recovery in negligence cases involving prenatal injury,C3 hospitalsj2
27. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1S96). In his dissent to the inztant case Judge Van
Voorhis would follow "the practical reason mentioned by Judge Holmes and Judge
Lehman . . ." that fictitious claims must result from the overruling of Mitchell. 10 N.-Y2d
at 244, 176 N.E.2d at 733, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
23. Id at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37.
29. Reed v. Ford, 129 Ky. 471, 112 S.W. 600 (1903) (no caute of action for fright
alone caused by defendant's assault of third party); Larabcrtson v. Consolidated Traction
Co., 60 NJ.L. 457, 3S Atl. 634 (1S97) (fright alone from bus accident will not LtLtain a
cause of action but where there is personal injury the fright nay then he considered);
Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 543, 61 At. 1022 (I10S) (fright causcd by
an explosion without physical injuries does not sustain a cause of action); Memphis St.
Ry. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917) (fright coupled with bodily pain
from accident sufficient as damages). In the last cited case the court stated that "mere
fright cannot be made the basis of a cause of action, and that damagei cannot ba allowed
for fright alone." 137 Tenn. at 637, 194 S.W.2d at 902.
30. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 320, 73 So. 205, 207 (1916).
But see Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Micb. L. RQV. 497 41922).
31. Wilcox v. Richmond & D.R.R., 52 Fed. 264 (4th Cir. 1.92); Smith v. Gowdy, 19G
Ky. 281, 244 S.V. 673 (1922).
32. Following the recent New Jersey decision of Henning.en v. Bloomfield Motor:Inc.,
32 N.J. 35S, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), dispensing with the need to show pridity of contract in
a breach of warranty situation, New York may well alter the time honorcd rule of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 3S2, 111 N.E. 1050 (1910), and no longer rcquire
a showing of privity.
33. See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951), ovcrruling Drobncr v.
Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), and allowing recovery for ne, Jicntl caucd
injuries to an unborn infant.
34. See Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S,2d 3 (1957), holding that
hospitals must answer under the rule of respondeat superior for the negligence of employec .
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food warranty,3 5 aggravation through mental disturbance of a physical injury,"
and blasting.3 7 On a complaint alleging "residual physical manifestations," the
question was not before the court and there is no reason why, if the mental
injury is, in fact, real, the right to bring a cause of action for mental disturbance
caused by fright should not be allowed.
Taxation-Mortgagee's Payment of Mortgagor's Defaulted Local Taxes
Inferior to Recorded Federal Tax Lien.-Defendant mortgagor became in-
solvent,' and defaulted in the payment of his 1957 and 1958 real estate taxes.
Mortgagee, authorized by the terms of the mortgage2 to make disbursements
necessary for protection of his lien, paid these taxes, to which local law gave
priority over the mortgage.3 Prior to mortgagee's payment, notice of a federal
tax lien had been recorded and the government subsequently commenced fore-
closure proceedings. Mortgagee claimed his payment of the local taxes had
priority over the federal lien because made pursuant to the terms of a mortgage
filed prior to the recordation of the federal tax liens.4 The decision of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in favor of
mortgagee 5 was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals. Where a
competing lien is inchoate and unperfected at the time notice of a federal tax
lien is filed, the competing lien is junior to the tax lien although originating
pursuant to the provisions of a pre-existing mortgage. United States v. Bond,
279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960).
35. See Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961),
dispensing with the need for infant plaintiff to show privity of contract in food warranty
cases where the father purchased the food.
36. See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
Plaintiff suffered a burn caused by defendant's negligence. Subsequently, her dermatologist
in treating the burn warned her to have regular checkups since cancer might develop.
Plaintiff was allowed to recover damages for the mental anguish she suffered from re-
sultant development of a "cancerophobia." The court stated in broad dictum that "freedom
from mental disturbance is now a protected interest in this State." Id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d
at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999. The court went on to note that this "appears to be the first
case in which a recovery has been allowed against the original wrongdoer for purely mental
suffering. . . ." Ibid.
37. See Schlansky v. Riegel, 146 N.Y.L.J., No. 45, Sept. 5, 1961, holding evidence of use
of excessive amounts of explosives to constitute a prima fade case of negligence.
1. The Government did not claim priority under Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C.
§ 191 (1958), which gives the United States priority over other creditors when the debtor
is insolvent. 279 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960).
2. The mortgagor was to pay all taxes promptly and keep title free of liens and litiga-
tion.
3. 279 F.2d at 840.
4. The mortgagee also claimed priority for an attorney's fee paid to protect the mortgage
lien. This claim was also defeated because of its uncertain nature at the time the federal
notice was filed.
5. United States v. Bond, 172 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Va. 1959).
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Priority for debts due the Crown was a prerogative well lmown to the com-
mon law.0 In the United States, however, this right was tempered by early
Supreme Court decisions7 which subordinated federal claims to other previously
existing encumbrances on the principle of "first in time, first in right." In 1S65
Congress created a federal tax lien," the statute granting no priority of itself
but in effect favoring the government by perfecting the lien against all interets
arising subsequent to the time of the tax assessment. The statute resulted in
a secret lien superior to all other claims, causing, e.g., an unfiled federal tax
lien to defeat a subsequent purchaser for value without notice of the lien.0 This
situation led to the enactment of section 6323(a)' J invalidating federal liens
as to mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and judgment creditors until recordation
of such liens. The instant court limited the protection granted the mortgagee
to cover only those sums actually expended before the recordation of the
assessment by the federal collector via an application of the "inchoate lien
test." 1
6. See United States v. State Bank, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 1332).
7. E.g., Brent v. Bank of Washington, 35 U.S. (10 Pct.) 596 11336); Unitcd Statca v.
Hack, 33 U.S. (S Pet.) 271 (1334) ; Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 336 (132,3).
See Marshall, CJ., in Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177 (1027), where it weas statcd
that "a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled to prior satisfaction .... " Id. at 179.
S. 13 Stat. 470-71 (165). Its provisions are presently incorporated in Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 6321, which provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax negccta or rcfuzeL
to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount,
addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any cost that may accrue in addition
thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all propsrty and rights to
property, whether real or personal, belonging to such peron." As to this federal tax lien
see Anderson, Federal Tax Liens--Their Nature and Priority, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 241 1953);
Cross, Federal Tax Claims: Nature and Effect of the Government's Weapons for Collec-
tion, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 9-26 (1953); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal
Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and Gcneral Lien, 63 Yale LJ. 05,
919-30 (1954) ; Peppin, Priority of Tax and Special Assessment Liens, 23 Calif. L. Rev. 264,
265-67 (1935); Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems (pts. 1 & 2), 13 Tax L.
Rev. 247, 459 (1953) ; Reiling, Priority of Federal Tax Liens, 36 Ta-xcs 973 (1953) ; Spencer,
Federal Tax Liens, 33 B.U.L. Rev. IS1, 1S4-203 (1953); Wolson, Federal Tax Licnas-A
Study in Confusion and Confiscation, 43 Marq. L. Rev. 10 (1959). Rev. Stat. § 34 6
(1375), 31 U.S.C § 191 (195S) provides: "Whenevwr any p.ron indebted to the United
States is insolvent .. . the debts due to the United States shall be first fatificd. . .:
In the instant case the debtor was insolvent but the court did not consider the cfect
of this section because the Government had not raised the i,cue on the trial. 279 F-Id
at 341. Cf. United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 430, 4.6 (1941); New York v. Maday, 2M3 U.S.
290, 294 (1933); Brent v. Bank of Washington, 35 U.S. (10 PetQ) 596 (1036).
9. United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1393).
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided . . .
the lien imposed by section 6321 shall not he valid as against any mortgagee, p~cdg.e,
purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the Secrtary....:
11. A lien will be treated as unperfected or inchoate under federal law unle: definite
as to the amount of the lien, the identity of the lienor, and the subject to which the lien
attaches. See United States v. Gilhert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953); United States v.
Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945); United States v. Knott, 293 US.
544 (1936).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Although this test was evolved to guarantee collection of federal claims
against insolvents, 12 it expanded over the past decade to defeat "unperfected"
liens in solvent situations as well. Beginning with United States v. Security
Trust & Say. Bank,13 where the test was applied to a solvent taxpayer to defeat
a prior statutory attachment lien which had not been reduced to judgment, the
Court has reaffirmed the principle and extended its application to a variety of
statutory lien situations,14 giving full weight to section 6321's", lien for as-
sessed taxes.
In a case analogous to the instant situation, United States v. R. F. Ball
Constr. Co.,16 the test was expanded to cover a competing contractual lien.
There the taxpayer, a subcontractor, had assigned sums receivable to his
surety as security for any future indebtedness he might incur. Notice of a
federal tax lien was recorded before any actual indebtedness to the surety
occurred, but because of the prior assignment, considered by the lower courts
as the equivalent of a mortgage, 17 the surety claimed a right of priority to the
sums receivable. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in a disappointingly
short per curiam opinion. "The instrument involved being inchoate and un-
perfected, the provisions of section 3672 (a) ...do not apply."18 The Court's
12. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale L.J. 905, 911-12 (1954). In early in-
solvency cases the Supreme Court held that previously executed mortgages were entitled to
priority over a debt due the United States, notwithstanding the provisions of the insolvency
test. E.g., Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828). The Court apparently
operated on the theory that the mortgaged property had passed to the mortgagee and no
longer was part of the mortgagor's estate. See United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
Whether a federal claim against an insolvent is entitled to priority over a pre-existing choate
lien has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court.
13. 340 U.S. 47 (1950). Mr. Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion, went a step
further and argued that the federal tax lien should be accorded preference over all liens
other than those expressly mentioned in section 6323(a). In effect, this view would re-
strict choate liens solely to those four classes of interest. However, the Court In United
States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), indicated that it was not willing to go
that far, and granted priority to a municipal tax lien which it deemed perfected. Between
two or more choate liens, priority will be based on the time at which they became choate.
Although by this reasoning choate liens other than those protected under section 6323(a)
may gain precedence if prior in time, the problem remains to find a competing lien to
meet the Court's standard of choateness.
14. United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) (per curiam) (mechanic's lien);
United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (per curiam) (mechanic's
lien) ; United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955) (per curiam) (mechanic's lien) ; United
States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) (landlord's distress lien); United States v. Liverpool
& London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955) (garnishment lien); United States v.
Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955) (attachment lien).
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
16. 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (per curiam), 27 Fordham L. Rev. 284.
17. R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956).
18. 355 U.S. at 587.
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brevity left uncertain whether the inchoate test was also to be applied to the
specifically protected interests of section 6323(a) as indicated by the Court's
reliance on Seczrity Trzst and United States v. City of .Ycw Britain.9 In the
latter decision the Court held a competing statutory lien sufficiently perfected
to defeat a federal lien because it was first in time. The reasoning of Ball
could be said to have been that the "instrument" involved was not a mortgage
and hence that the surety, since not a mortgagee, was not protected by section
6323(a). Weight was added to the latter interpretation by the reasoning of
the Ball dissent to the effect that the instrument was in fact a mortgage and
hence the mortgagee was protected.--' Thus the dichotomy of opinion in the
instant case: the dissent found Ball not determinative-interpreting it as hold-
ing that the instrument was not a mortgage and so not within the purview of
the statute. Thus freed of the Ball holding, the dissent argued that the words of
section 6323(a) should be used in their "usual, conventional sense" to protect
not mortgages but mortgagees. 2 The majority of the present court found Ball
to require perfection of the lien before section 6323(a) could be applied, reason-
ing that the Ball Court had determined that, although a mortgage, the "instru-
ment" had been inchoate.22
Because the instant case places the mortgagee in a quandary when the
mortgagor defaults in the payment of local taxes-local laws subordinate his
lien to local tax claims but his payment of them will go unrecompensed if a
federal tax lien has been recorded-the reasoning of the dissent has great appeal
and its solution is apparently fairer to the parties. Still, the majority's interpreta-
tion of Ball is more reasonable. The use, in Ball, of the word "instrument" was
unfortunate but the Court's language can only be construed to mean "mort-
gage." For, whether choate or inchoate, perfected or unperfected, had the instru-
ment not been a mortgage, there would have been no question of the application
of section 6323(a). Neither the lower courts nor the parties themselves doubted
that the surety was a mortgagee. The question, therefore, was whether the
"inchoate lien test" was applicable to a mortgagee, and, if so, did he pass the
test. The Court impliedly answered the first question in the affirmative by
answering the second in the negative. While strongly disagreeing with the
decision, the dissent there apparently did not object to the application of the
test to what they considered a prior mortgage 2 3
The reasoning of the majority in the present case is logically consistent with
19. 347 U.S. S1 (1954).
20. 355 U.S. at 5SS-94 (dissent).
21. "[Tlhe preference cannot be limited to the mortgagee's right to repayment of the
principal.... It extends to all those rights which the Congrecs must have known the
mortgagee commonly and usually possesses. Provisions in mortgages requiring or pcrmitting
the mortgagee to discharge ad valorem tax liens and extending the mortgage lien to such
disbursements, as well as to the expense of enforcement of the mortgagee's rights, are
commonplace." 279 F.2d at 351 (dissent). See Cross, Federal Tax Claims: Nature and
Effect of the Government's Weapons for Collection, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 27, 30 (1953).
22. 279 F.2d at 845.
23. United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 US. S 53.S-94 (dissent).
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the evolving policy of the Supreme Court,2 4 indicating the federal trend of
imposition of the priority of section 346625 on the tax lien of section 6321.
This construction limits but does not end the protection provided by Congress
in section 6323(a). Free alienation of property is still safeguarded from the
danger of a secret lien, but, just as one who becomes a mortgagee after notice
of a federal tax lien has been filed will not be protected, so also a mortgagee
will not be protected for additional expenditures made subsequent to notice of a
federal lien2 Legislation has been suggested for the protection of prior mort-
gagees who are forced to expend monies (even after notice of federal tax
liens) in order to protect their investment.27 Until the enactment of such
legislation, it behooves a mortgagee to check closely before making any dis-
bursements, regardless of the terms of the mortgage.
24. "We have derived an indelible impression from the cases (involving determination
of priority of federal tax liens over competing liens) decided by the Supreme Court, which
reveal the persistent application of the choate lien test, first in insolvency cases, then In
statutory lien cases, and finally in nonstatutory contractual lien cases." 279 F.2d at 845.
25. Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
26. In United States v. Christensen, 269 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1959), the court of appeals
held that a filed federal tax lien was superior to a prior mortgagee's claim for realty taxes
which the mortgagee had paid after the recordation of the federal lien. However, section
6323(a) was not considered.
27. See, e.g., Cross, Federal Tax Claims: Nature and Effect of the Government's Weapons
for Collection, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 30 (1958).
